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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
There is within this nation today a growing concern over the deterio­
ration of the quality of the natural environment. A major goal of national 
policy is seeking the best means for lessening the degradation of the soil, 
air and water tliat has occurred, and for improving environmental quality 
over time (2U). 
Water quality is an important conçonent of the environment. Evidence 
of a national concern with the quality of its waters is found in the out­
pouring during the past few years of statutes (L3, lOii, 105), of r^orts 
by review and planning groiçs (31, Ul, 65, 66, 9U, 103), in monographs and 
proceedings of synçjosia by scholars (2b, 27j 50, 5l, 113), and in the 
popular media (1, 110). 
Agriculture has been singled out as an important source of water 
pollution (11, 78, 109). 
This study proposes to examine one facet of the water quality "prob­
lem", namely the impact on water quality of substances introduced into 
surface watercourses from the agricultural sector and the associated costs 
of their abatement. Specifically, sediment and its associated pollutants 
will be used for intensive study in terms of estimating the least-cost 
means of enhancing the quality of waters degraded by them. In addition, 
several institutional or structural^ arrangements for administering a 
^he terps "institutional" and "structural", as used in this study, 
are idmpical in meaning, and;, therefore, will be used interchangeably. 
The terms are defined in CSaapter H. 
2 
water quality management program Kill be eacandned for their ability to 
meet certain criteria that will be developed. 
Water Quality and the Agricultural Sector 
Water quality and water pollution in an economic context 
A water su^iply may be considered an economic resource if and whan it 
ediibits the characteristic of scarcity and is subject to allocation among 
competing uses. A stçply can serve as either an input or a commodity» 
Economic scarcity need not r&Late to the total physical supply if one takes 
the view that water supplies are not homogeneous entities. They can, in 
fact, be differentiated in terms of quality as well as by time and space. 
Therefore, watei' supplies should be viewed as a group of quality-
differentiated inputs or commodities (91, pp. U7-U9). 
Water pollution is a supply-related concept. It is defined in the 
economic context as a change in the characteristic (s) of a water supply 
such that additional costs (monetized or non^monetized) must be bome by 
the next user in order that the quality charactei^siMas relevant to his 
use can be met (8, p. $8). In other words, water pollution is a problem 
invrolving eoctemal diseconomies. Water pollutants, then, are substances 
that can cause cost changes in water quality. 
Demands for water may also be differentiated on the basis of time, 
space, and quality. Associated with each demand is a set of physical, 
chemical, or biological parameters. Water quality is a demand-oriented 
concept. The term will be used to mean the particular set of specifica­
tions associated with a particular use of water. Thus, within the eco-
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nocàc context, miter quality is a relative rather than an absolute concept. 
As Biidek and Taylor (8, p. 5B) point out, water quality should be related 
to the use (actual or potential) to be made of the water rather than to 
some deviation Sram a level designated as the "natural state". 
Water-borne siibstances may or may not be pollutants, depending vpon 
the use to be made of the water. Further, the changes in quality charac­
teristics of water to be considered in this study are almost entirely the 
result of man's actions and thus are subject to his control, finally, it 
should be noted that a pollution situation may arise through a change in 
demand, even thou^ the characteristics of the supply are unchanged (8, 
pp. 58-^9). 
Point and diffuse pollution sources 
Pollutants may be grouped into two broad categories according to their 
source. The particular polluting substances found in each category are not 
imtually exclusive. Kowev^ ti?» dichstssisstiiirn is usefiu an guxdxng the 
approach taken in the analysis. 
On the one hand, there are what are termed "point sources" of pollu­
tion. In this case the location of the point of entxy of the polluting 
substance into the watercourse can be pinpointed with a hi^ degree of 
accuracy. Examples of point source waste discharges would include outfalls 
from industrial plants, from municipal waste treatment plants, and in some 
instances, runoff Arom anijnal feedlots. Tbid majority of the engineering-
economic analysis of water pollution, both of a conc^tual and empirical 
nature, has dealt with this type of pollution.^ 
^^ee, e.g., Kheese and Bower (51), Deininger (19), and Kerri (U9). 
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The second category of pollutants includes what are referred to as 
«areal", "diffuse", or "nonpoint" sources. As inferred by the name, the 
pollutants enter the watercourse over a wide area and it is difficult to 
determine their precise point of origin. Substances such as silt, ferti­
lizers, and pesticides, transported either by surface runoff or through 
groundwater aquifers, fall into this category. In fact, the majority of 
polluting substances arising from the agricultural sector fall into this 
second category. 
The distinction between the two types of pollution is of significance 
as one attenpts to devise efficient, equitable pollution abatement schemes. 
When dealing with diffuse sources, the problems of determining who contrib­
uted how much of a stream's pollution load are exceedingly difficult. One 
has an intuitive feeling that the institutional arrangements for dealing 
with the two types of pollution may well be very different. 
Agriculture as a source of diffuse pollutants 
Substances transported in watercourses may be classified In a variety 
of ways. Perhaps the simplest scheme divides the substances into those 
that are degradable and those nondegradable ly the biological processes 
occurring in natural waters (50, p. 11). Another listing of materials 
entering watercourses specifies eight classes: (1) sewage and other oxygen 
demanding wastes, (2) infectious agents, (3) plant nutrients, (1;) organic 
chemical exotics, (l?) other mineral and chemical substazices, (6) sediasAts, 
(7) radioactive substances, and (8) heat (103, p. 1). The agriculture 
sector can be a contributing source to the first six of the ei^t classes.^ 
"krhe physical impact on the environment of the six sources arising 
from agriculture has been detailed by WadLeigh (109). 
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A substance that falls into one of the six classes "will be termed a 
potential pollutant. In general, amy substance or coggpound of agricul­
tural origin that fits Into one of the six classes %i31 find its wgr into 
a watercourse via diffuse means. 
As this is a study of abating water pollutants from the agricultural 
sector, any of the six classes of potential pollutants could serve as the 
focus for the study. The class of pollutants selected for ijxv-estigation 
is seddmemt. Sediment is an attractive candidate for both conceptual and 
practical reascns. Perhaps the most ingportant aspect of sedis^-t is that 
it can act not only as a pollutant per se, but also as a trana&crting 
agent in a manner analogous to water Other potential poUatants from 
the categories chemical nutrients (phoqAates) and organic chmlcal 
eowtics (pesticides) are adsorbed onto soil particles. If iJxe soil is 
eroded into a watercourse, the adsorbed substances are carried along and 
thus are capable of movement over time and space. 
Sediment also has the added characteristic that, r^ative to some of 
the other potential pollutants, its transport mechanism is better under^ 
stood and considerable enqpirical data are available. It is also lûanned 
that the analysis can be structured in such a way that sediment will 
as a surrogate for other nondegradable pollutants. Ih thie way, the model 
would be adaptable to other pollutants as data become svailabl^v finally, 
technical change is less likely to make the findings of a study dealing 
with sediment outdated. This is not true of certain other classes of 
pollutants, e.g., insecticides, lAere new formulations are being li'Kiiro-
^ater as a transport agent is discussed in the next section. 
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ctuced 80 rapidly that frequently a compound is no longer widely used ty 
the tine sufficient data are available for economic analysis. 
Vfeitercourses as transport agents 
Few, if axy, of the nation's surface water su$>{ûies are "pure" in a 
chemical or biological sense Indeed, this was true even before man 
inhabited the North American continent. Ever since there has been animal 
and plant life, watercourses have received the waste and decay products of 
these life forms together with the sediment resulting from natural erosion 
of the land, nomologists recognize this fact in their discussions of 
"lake succession" lAere oligotrophic lakes, throuj^ natural evolutionary 
processes, are subject to gradual eatrophLcation (111, pp. 352-35U)* This 
study is not concerned with these natural processes, but instead it focuses 
upon the accelerated aa&Lwlatad 'mxîeztn' 
man. The main point to be made here, however, is that watercourses serve 
as a transport agent for a large variety of substances, and this has always 
been so. In fact, the dilution and carriage of municipal and industrial 
wastes is smetimes cited as a "beneficial use" of a watercourse (92, 
p. 668). 
The concept of flowing surface waters as tran^orting agents has 
iaportant economic implications. The watercourse, acting as a carriage 
system for a variety of substances, serves to connect, in a physical sense, 
various users (uses) of the water svqprply. This transport ability of a 
watercourse will be termed the linkage between the various economic units 
^See, e.g., Eair and Morrison's study of "high quality" mountain 
streams (26). 
using the water. It is the linkage mechanism of vater acting as a trans­
port agent that provides the necessaxy conditions for the possible exist­
ence of external effects, i.e., "off-site" or interfirm effects. 
As previously noted, sediment can act as a transport agent or linkage 
mechanism in a manner completely analogous to watercourses. 
The problematic situation 
Paraphrasing Professor Tinmons (88, p. 1127), water quality problems 
as interpreted in this study are defined in terms of conflicts, confusions, 
and uncertainties regarding future courses of action in the use of -water. 
ttildreth and Castle (3U, pp. 23-25) suggest four methods: of problem 
identification: (1) discovering the felt needs of the individual or 
society: (2) dstezmlalng tW ^ ps tetweem the actual achievements and the 
goals of individuals or society; (3) determining the deviation from an 
optimum as defined ty theory; and (li) investigation of an intellectual 
difficulty felt by the researcher. As suggested in the opening pages of 
this chapter, the felt needs of society vie-àrvls water quality have been 
expressed, especially through the statutes already enacted. While it Is 
possible to develop from economic theory the conditions for an optimum 
level of water quality, as shall be seen in thn next chapter, the quanti­
fication of such an optimum and, therefore, any deviations from it, is 
exceedingly difficult if not ijnpossible. This leaves the second and fourth 
methods of problem Identification. They shall be used in combination to 
delimit the problem to be studied. The goals of society as es^ressed in 
proposed water quality standards for various water uses (demands) shall be 
taken as the norm. Since the optimum level of water quality cannot be 
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determined, the least cost means for achieving the norms will be detei> 
mined. Deviation between the existential situation and the noms, i.e., 
Ijie "gap", can be lessened by alterations in the Institutional structure. 
Alternative institutional arrangements will be studied to determine their 
effectiveness in closing the gap and their incidence of costs. 
The norm One would expect that one of the better expressions of 
society's preferences concerning water quality would be found in its 
statutes and regulations. Unfortunately, both the Federal and Iowa 
statutes are silent on the matter of standards for specific poXLutants in 
watercourses. Moreover, no state (or Federal) regulations have been 
promulgated that relate speciflcaUy to aHlowafole turbidity or suspended 
- wedbfBSiW'vtmWis; ' "In' aibaiagea -of-nzzssy - ..sefaimemt 
"criteria" proposed for several water uses by the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Administration^ (FWPCA) will be used as a proxy for societal goals. 
It should be pointed out that the îWPCA criteria are technological In 
nature. In fact, the FVVPGA r^ort distinguishes between "standards" and 
"criteria". Standards are defined as "a plan that is established by 
governmental authorities as a program for water pollution prevention and 
abatement." A synonjm is "objective". Criteria are defined as "a sciei>-
tlfic requirement on which a decision or judgement may be based concerning 
the suitability of water quality to siqiport a designated use." A synorym 
is "requirement" (98, p. vii) „ Since this stuc^y takes the position that 
water quality is a use-oriented concept, it does not seem unreasonable to 
take as norms use criteria or requirements. 
"^Thls agency is now known as the Federal Water Quality Administration. 
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Deviations from the norm The gap that is found between existing 
conditions of water quality and the norm can be attributed to several 
causes. It may be that the norms are technologically infeasible and/or 
economically irrational, i.e., unattainable by any known technology or 
attainable only at very high (infinite) cost. Should this be the case, 
the analysis will show it. The implication of such a result is that 
society must reconsider its goals. A more probable cause for divergence 
from the norm are the external effects characteristic of water pollution. 
If this is the case, institutional readjustments are needed. Hnal.ly, the 
gap may be the result of inadequacies or hinderances in the existing struc­
tures. Again, readjustment of the structures are called for. 
_ _ th^,^ of the nation's 
watercourses by the agricultural sector. The major remedial Içrpothesis of 
this study is that bold, imaginative changes in institutional forms are 
needed if society is to achieve its goals. 
Objectives of the Study 
In order to understand and ameliorate the problem of water pollution 
from agricultural sources the study seeks to achieve the fo31owj.ng objec­
tives. 
1. To determine means of bringing together quality-differentiated 
demands and water supplies of differing qualities. 
2. To calculate the least cost means for balancing supplies with 
demzmds through manipulation of the quality of the supjOy. 
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3. To exandne alternative structural arrangements, having explicit 
cost distributions, for their ability to cope effectively with the 
problem of supf^ying a "collective good". 
The first objective calls attention to the need for specification of 
certain physical relationships. The anaOytic framework most include the 
pollution sources, transmission linkages, and potential uses of the supply 
that vary both in quantity and quality of water demanded. 
The second objective premises that water quality in^ovanent can be 
achieved in a variety of ways, with different costs associated with each. 
The third objective focuses oh the inherent in the provision 
of public goods, viz., tjfeâ' quantity to be srçplied, W; the costs are to 
be shared, and W* to organize to collectively supply the good» .. 
Methods and Procedures 
The analytic framework 
The basic approach in the analysis involves examining quality-
differentiated supplies and demands for water within an intrastate river-
basin.^ Movement of sediment and its associated potential pollutants off 
the land and dovjn the watercourse will be approximated by relationships 
taken from agronomic and engineering sciences. Undoubtedly, many of these 
approximations will be crude and involve many simplifying assumptions, but 
they will be the best representation of the œdsting "state of the art" in 
Conceptually, there is no limit on the size of the hydrologie unit 
employed. However, with increasing size comes greater administrative and 
political canplexities. 
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these disclplizies. In this -way the transmission linkage between the 
various parts of the basin will be specified. 
The same disciplines will provide cost and effectiveness data for a 
set of erosion prevention and water quality ijqarovament techniques. 
Since it is not feasible to consider every possible Isvd of poUur-
tion abatement, a set of discrete levels of water quality will be speci­
fied that reflect, in a gross way, the requirements of alternative uses 
of the watercourse. 
The collectivity of specified relationships, techniques, and use 
requirements provide the basis for meeting the first objective. 
Calculation of the least-cost means of achieving the quality level 
required for a particular use (objective two) will be made using linear 
programndng as the analytical technique. 
Objective three will attempt to indicate how pollution abatement 
measures are to be financed under differing assunptions of will bear 
the costs. Political-institutional systems have been proposed, both in 
the economic literature and in legislative chambers, to deal with both 
considerations. In meeting the third objective several institutional 
arrangements will be studied and their ability to meet institutional 
"criteria" determined. 
Application of the model 
Use of the model will be demonstrated throu^ application to an 
idealized representation of an Iowa river basin. Aggregated basins-wide 
data are available for the Nishnabotna River Basin in the form "acres in 
various land uses by land-capability classes and subclasses". The basin. 
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as represented by these data^ will be used as the study area. Some 
simplifying assunptions «ill be made and certain data Kill have to be 
synthesized. Far exanple, it will be necessary to assume a uniform soil 
type throughout the basin. A single delivery ratio will be specified. 
Water uses that may not actually exist at present in the basin can be 
included. Because of these limitations^ the findings of the stu^y should 
not be considered as directly applicable to the lELshnabotna Basin. 
Despite the abstraction from reality introduced by the restrictions, data 
needs in terms of form and type are made eacplicit. If interdisciplinary 
research is to progress, the social scientist must comunioate such needs 
to the physical scientist. 
Organization of the Stu^y 
In the first chapter the concepts of water quality and pollution as 
economic problems are developed. Some terms are defined and the relation­
ship of the agricultural sector to pollution is specified. The pollutant 
transmission linkages are discussed and the problematic situation is 
presented. In addition, the objectives of the study are stated and the 
procedures and methodology to be used are outlined. 
Chapter II discusses the dimensions—physical, economic, amd insti­
tutional—of the problem of erosion and sedimentation. The analytical 
model is developed in the third chapter and applied to the study area in 
Chapter IV. Alternative institutional arrangements are proposed and 
discussed in Chapter V. The conclusions, implications, and summary of the 
studbr are presented in Chapter VI. ' 
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CmPTER II. SEDIMENT MD ASSOGI&TED FOUSTâinS: 
THE DIMENSIONS OF TEE PROBLEM 
Any analysis of pollutants and poXLixblon must recognize and take into 
account three dimensions of the problematic situation. Not only must the 
dimensions be recognized, but also their interdependencies miist be conr 
sidered. SpecificalHy, the relevant dimensions of the problem encoiq>ass 
(1) physical (technological^ hydrologie) relationships^ (2) economic Con­
siderations, and (3) institutional (structural) forms. The threefold 
framework of water quality management is illustrated in figure 1 and the 
interaction among the three elements is discussed in the next section. 
Use of this framework aids the analysis in that it suggests the kinds of 
models needed to answer the objectives of the study and points up the data 
needs. 
The Three Dimensions and Their Interrelationships 
An Integrated approach to water quality management requires consider­
ation of what is physically possible, economically feasible, and insti­
tutionally permissible. 
The pHwical dimension of water quality control emphasizes vfliat is 
technologically possible. It is the function of the physical scientist 
and the engineer both to make known the existing state of the art and to 
advance that state. The relationship between technological advances and 
the matter of selecting among new technologies has been stated fay Hmmons 
and Dougal (92, p. 668); 
Althou^ the continual expansion of physical possibilities is 
necessary for continued econonic progress, technology in and by 
itself does not permit choice nor does it reveal the economic 
INSTITUTIONAL 
Laws 
and 
Other Controls  ^
/ i Certainty Flexibility 
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Figure 1. Conceptual illustration of the physical, economic, and 
institutional interrelationships in water quality man­
agement (adapted from Tinnons, 69, p. 172) 
consequences of particular choices. The range of choice is broad­
ened throu^ Physical studies, but the ma3dng of decisions by 
individuals and by public entities necessitates inqpiiries into the 
economic dimension idiich is responsible for revealing «Aich physical 
or t^shnical possibilities are economically feasible. 
Economic analysis that is not founded igxm an adequate representation 
of the underlying physical aspects will be sterile if not incorrect. Eco­
nomic feasibility may be expressed in terms of the costs of alternative 
solutions. Thus, an en^Jieering proposal that does not offer alternative 
solutions, bub rather is based solely iQ>on a "requirements" approach (IOJOS 
a factor of safety), may be needlessly costly. 
Davis (18, pp. 120-121) has pointed out another cause of insufficient 
attention being given to a broad range of solutions to a problem. All too 
frequently planning agency personnel, be they social or physical scien­
tists, gear their "solutions" to the technological approach with lAich 
their ageoicy is best acquainted, lilhile part of the problem here involves 
the institutional constraints juigwsed upon the agency, a certain amount of 
technological myopia does exist and inhibits the breadth of the analysis. 
To free the analysis of an existing set of structures is to open the 
way for ijnportant eagloration into means of dealing with the problematic 
situation. lack of this Areedom inhibits much of the analysis action 
agencies. Even if technological myopia and inadequate economic analysis 
are assumed away, Davis (18, p. 8) calls attention to the fact that it is 
still unlik&ly that a broad range of alternatives will be presented because 
of the existing institutional complexity of the public agencies involved. 
Agencies tend to have limited domains which limit the alternatives they 
may consider, e.g., the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers xney involve itself in 
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srultîpuxpose reservoirs that can be used for low-flow augmentation, but it 
is not authorized to |ûan and build waste treatment facilities. 
Also, under existing structures, certain alternatives are politically 
more attractive than others, i.e., a Federally financed reservoir for flow 
augmentation that benefits a city is more appealing to the taxpayers of 
that city than a municipal waste treatment plant they must finance 
entirely locally. 
Each of the three dimensions is discussed in seme detail in the 
following sections. 
The Physical Dimension 
This section discusses the magnitude and eoctent of the "sediment 
problem". In addition, since agronomic and hydrologie relationships 
underlie amy consideration of soil erosion and sediment transport, inform 
nation available from these disciplines will be presented, finally, means 
for reducing sediment loads in surface watercourses will be described. 
The magnitude and impact of sedimentation 
It is estimated that four billion tons of sediment from soil erosion 
enter the nation's watercourses each year (109, p. 36), This loading of 
streams is thou^t to be at least 700 times that caused by the discharge 
of sewage (103, p, 11), Nearly 600 million acres or about one-third of 
the land area of the TAiited States are contributing to the sediment load. 
However, erosion control measures appear to be warranted economically oiùy 
on about 300 Willi on acres (103, p, 12), 
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Erosion of the soil has both on-site and off-site effects. At the 
same tine that the quality of the receiving itaters is being degraded, the 
eroding land is bejjig deleted. It is estimated that more than 50 million 
tons of primary nutrients are lost via erosion from agricultural and 
forest lands yearly (109, p. 2b). 
The products of soil erosion reach streams Arom a wide variely of 
sources. Mlthin the agricultural and forest products sector, sediment may 
con» from cultivated fields, bumed-over forest lands, logging roads, and 
overgrazed rangelands. In addition, such diverse activities as highway, 
suburban and industrial construction, roadside cuts, and strip mining 
contribute significant quantities of sediment, finally, there is lâiat can 
be termed "natural erosion" from unstabillzed stream banks and other geo­
logic erosicm, e.g., the South Dakota Badlands (109, p. 2U). 
The effects of sediment on the environment are equally diverse. 
There are the obvious cases in which stream channels, reservoirs, irri­
gation canals, lakes and farm ponds are filled. In turn, the sediment 
load in these bodies of water cause secondary effects. Public, industrial 
and sprinkler irrigation water supplies must be givei additional treatment 
to reduce turbidity. The aesthetic value of lakes, ponds, and streams 
varies inversely with their turbidity level. Suspended sediment affects 
the dissolved oxygen level of streams and thus impacts on the stream's 
capacity to assijodlate oxygen-demanding substances as well as i^on Hah 
populations (109, p. 2U). Aquatic life may also be affected lAen spawning 
nests and food supplies are blazdceted with sediment (103, p. U). Damage 
to turbine blades in power generating plants is another exaxqile of the 
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adverse effect of sediment, flood-bome sediment can damage crops and 
overlay fertile soils with infertile materials (109, p. 36). finally, as 
noted previously^ sedijnent may act as a carrier of other pollutants siich 
as pesticide residues and phosphorous conpounds. 
dearly, sediment is a spoiler of the environment of major conse­
quence, iii;>acting on many segments of the econcmqr. It is the classic 
exanple of the ecologists* definition of a pollutant, i.e., "a resource 
out of place" (65, p. 35). 
Soil erosion prediction 
Soil movement from individual fields unda? varying conditions of 
topography, soil type, rainfall intensity and duration, cropping practices, 
and erosion control practices is reasonably veil understood. Application 
of the so-called "universal soil-loss equation" gives long term (25 years 
or more) average erosion losses caused by rainfall (115, p. 1*1). Pre­
diction of soil losses from individual storms or even ex ante predictions 
for a specific year are less reliable (115, pp. 39-1*0). 
Estimation of soil losses from watersheds is even less reliable 
because of conçlexities of topography, soils, and patterns of land use. 
Moreover, if one is interested only in the sediment that actually reaches 
the -watercourse, it is necessary to adjust the soil loss estimate for that 
portion of the sediment deposited in terrace channels, grassed waterways, 
sodded fence rows, etc. "Factors to adjust gross-erosion estimates for 
these situations have not been evaluated" (115, p. 1*3). 
Some atteinpts have been made to correlate the delivery ratio, i.e., 
the percentage of the total soil loss from an area that is delivered to a 
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specific point, wLth the size (square miles) of the drainage area. 
1 OeneraUy, an inverse relationship is posited. However, as Beer eb al. 
(6) have pointed out, at least for the loess soil areas of western Iowa, 
the deliveiy ratio and drainage area are not highly correlated (r ^  0.1^3). 
Understandably, scientists studying these relationships have not yet 
isolated ain the relevant variables. Confronted %ith such ctsiçlex phe­
nomena, their first efforts have been highly empirical and, as a result, 
the transferability of results between areas is low. ]h the stu^y area 
discussed in Chzgpter IV, a "topical" dalivery ratio for the study area 
will be assumed. 
Sediment transport 
]n, describing the linkage system in the analytical model, it idll be 
necessary to specify the manner in "tAich fluvial sediment is transported 
2 by the watercourse. A review of the literature dealing wiUi this subject 
is not encouraging. Speaking in 1956 before a ^ ysposium on watershed 
erosion and sediment yields, Benedict (7, p. 897) noted that "... perhaps 
too much emphasis has been placed on the individual modes (contact or bed 
load, saltation, suspended load) of sediment transport and not enou^ on 
the mechanics of total transport." VMle acknowledging that some advance 
ments had been made in understanding sediment movement, he concluded 
". . . additional field and laboratory research is required to provide a 
^e, e.g., Figure G-l6 and compare with figure G-19, in Appendix G, 
DMRB (li2). 
^fluvial sediment is defined as sediment that is transported by, 
suspended in, or deposited by streams (16). 
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better understandliig of known factors and to define the unknown factors 
that affect the sediment discharge of streams" (7, p. 902). 
Numerous attempts to esqplain sediment discharge In terns of hydraulic 
parameters and sediment properties have been made. In I960, Vanoni et al» 
(106, Chapters 6, 7) reviewed several of the better known bedload sediment 
discharge formulas, idiich were developed previously from laboratory 
studies, and ccanpared than with actual stream measurements. These fohmi-
las attempt to relate the water discharge of a river and the sediment 
discharge. Figure 2 illustrates the widely vaiying results obtained with 
the different formulas. Vanoni and his associates concluded, in part, 
that they could not strongly recom&ad any of the formulas, further, they 
pointed out that sediment discharge values calculated from the formulas 
"... are to be considered as estimates on]y since the errors involved 
may be 100^ or more" (106, p. 7-lU)« 
Addressing a 1^63 symposium, Sheprpard (80) discussed the suitability 
of five alternative means of detenndning total sediment quantities in 
streams. The five categories divide into two groqos. 3h the first, sedi­
ment yield rates, i.e., average sediment production for a drainage area 
expressed in terms of weight per unit area per unit time period, are used. 
This essentially is the procedure described in the preceding section in 
which gross erosion estimates plus sediment delivery ratios are used.^ 
The second groiç uses su^ended sediment sampling data and four variations 
of ways for estimating the unmeasured bedload. 
"^eld rates may also be determined from sediment volumes (storage 
loss) in reservoirs or farm ponds, based on resurv^ results. 
îlgure 2. Sediment rating curves according to several formulas 
coirgpared with field observations (106, pp. 7-6) 
i 
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2L^d rate techniques are applicable primariZy to small drainage 
areas since sediment production is taken to be a function of the character 
of the drainage area rather -Uian of stream htydraulics (80, p. 273). 
Determinations of sediment quantities based on suspended sediment 
sa%iqp]ing data are also subject to serious error. First, any of the 
sampling devices currently used do not measure the total suspended sedi­
ment. Second, an estdmate of the bedload must be made involving aU the 
deficiencies noted previously with the sediment discharge foimulas. 
Finally, the period of record for stream and sediment discharges is £r»> 
quently too short for accurate determination of suspended load determi­
nations (80, pp. 21hr2n), 
It appears that no major breakthrou^ has been made in recent years in 
what has been termed a "rational" approach to understanding sediment trans­
port. Much of the work continues to be strictly enqpirical. The contents 
of a textbook (71) published in 1567 seems to svqpport tlxLs conclusion. 
Aimed at an audience of senior and graduate level civil engineering 
students, the chapter dealing with sediment discharge formulas draws 
heavily on the Keck laboratory report.^ In fact, the Keck report is the 
most recent reference ^ven at the end of the chapter. Chapter 8 in the 
same volume dealing with sediment suspension, cites no literature later 
than 1963. In discussing suspended sediment, the author appraises the 
state of the art in the following way: 
^Compare Chapter 6 in Raudkivi (71) with Chapter 6 and 7 in Vanvoni 
et al. (106). 
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The turb\ilsnt suspension, of sediment may be visualized as an advanced 
stage of saltation and bed-load movement, but the available analyti­
cal methods are not yet capable of describing the transport of bed 
load and suspended load by one relationship onOly. There are formulae 
of empirical or semi-enpirical nature 'Hhich attempt such an overall 
solution, but as yet a completely successful analysis is still out­
standing, (71, p. 105) 
For the purposes of the present study, the following simplifying 
assuiTQitions Mil be made regarding sediment transport. Suspended sediment 
data will be taken as a measure of the total sediment load of a stream. 
Sediment yields and the previously mentioned assurption concerning the 
delivery ratio will be used "in reverse" when the analysis requires speci­
fication of the ultjjnate sowce of the sediment load. The first assuit^ 
tion does not deviate sharply from reality in that sediment from sheet and 
gully erosion tends to be so fine as to have only a small amount of bed-
load (80, p. 275). The Iowa Geological Survey (L5, p. U8) has stated that 
"bedload of most of the streams of Iowa is a small fraction of the total 
load, probably less than l5^, as stream slopes are low and the particle 
sizes of the suspended sediments are small." One might expect that the 
bedload would constitute an even smaller percentage of the total in the 
loess soil areas. 
The second asaunçtion is necessary for inçlementing the analysis in 
the face of less than full knowledge of soil erosion and transport 
mechanics. 
Physical control of sedijnsnt 
Methods for reducing the sediment load in "watercourses may be grouped 
together into two broad categories. IDa the first group are idjat may be 
termed land treatment practices. These are primarily agronomic in nature. 
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and include use of various forms of vegetation as cover; tillage, 
and cultivation practices; terracing; contouring; and strip cropping. It 
has been pointed out that these practices "... incorporate mangr of the 
same principles of -water-floK control to reduce or eliminate sheet 
erosion; i.e., interception of precipitation near the arrival site, sur­
face detention, silt deposition, soil infiltration, slow release of excess 
Tfater and degradation or attenuation of potential pollutants within the 
biologically and chemically active soil filter" (112, p. 305). 
The second group is comprised of what may be termed engineering 
structures. Their primary function is to control the rate of water-flow, 
both over the land and in the stream. This category includes small grade 
stabilization structures, larger gully stabilization structures with water 
detention features, desilting ba^ns, and large reservoirs. Additional 
engineering practices (as opposed to structures) may be appended to this 
listing. These would include the cosmon^y used flocculation and rapid 
sand filtration techniques ençloyed in municipal water treatment plants 
(57, pp. U26-U35) as well as the still experimental use of polymeric 
flocculants for in-place river water clarification (1;8). 
Cost and effectiveness data for tdie various practices and structures 
will be introduced later when the linear programming activities are formu­
lated in Chapter IV. 
In summary, that portion of fltnrial sediment that is the product of 
agricultural land eroded by rainfall clearly constitutes a major potential 
pollutant of watercourses. Means of estimating movement of soil off the 
land and through the watercourse exist. Imperfections in the prediction 
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methods will be circumvented by means of simplifying assunptions, since 
the focus of the study is on developing an approach to abating sedimentary 
pollution rather than detailed empirical analysis. A broad spectrum of 
means for controlling sediment are available for consideration. 
The Economic Dimension 
The preceding section focused on the physical possibilities (and 
limitations) for estimating sediment movement and means of abating sedi­
ment, Indeed, physical efficiency criteria for dealing with sediment may 
be stated, e,g,, selection of those abatement techniques that maximize 
sediment removal. However, to follow such a course ignores the economic 
consequences associated with the choice. As long as resources (means of 
abatement) carry strictly positive costs, any complete analysis of a 
problematic situation must consider the economic feasibility of the solu-
tion(s) as well as the physical possibilities. 
Water pollutants, of >M.ch sediment and its associated substances are 
exaitç)les, possess inçortant economic characteristics in that they exhibit 
external effects. Two areas of economic theory, namely welfare economics 
and public expenditure economics, have evolved to explain and suggest 
policy prescriptions for problems associated with external effects. The 
following pages review those portions of welfare and public finance theory 
deemed relevant to water pollution and water quality. The discussion 
begins with the inadequacy of a "private goods" model, moves into exter­
nalities and public goods, and concludes with some comments on the case 
for public intervention and the role of the political process. 
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The economic theory of external effects 
External effects or "externalities" are said to exist "• • • vhen an 
activity on the part of one person (his production or his consonption of 
some good or service) affects the utility or cost function of a second 
person" (13, p. ii08). Thus, the basic emphasis is on the interdependence 
of utility or production functions. However, the best known model of the 
economist, that of perfectly competitive markets, assumes anray aU such 
interdependencies (53, p. Itl). This model, under certain highly restric­
tive assunptioms, describes the allocation of resources so as to "maximize 
welfare". %e correspondence between competitive equilibrium and Fareto-
efficiency one finds in the model of perfectly- competitive markets is 
shattered when certain types of external effects are introduced. These 
"market-failure" elements have been described elsewhere and the argument 
will not be repeated here.^ The important point to recognize is that the 
perfectly competitive model is inadequate to deal with external effects. 
The model is actually one that deals with lAat may be termed, "purely 
private consumption goods". In one sense it represents a polar case. 
"What is needed then, is an antipodal model for the "purely public consunp-
tion good", Such a model has been presented by Sarauelson (75, 76). 
Samuelson (76, p. 387) defines a collective or public good as one 
where "... each individual's consunption of such a good leads to no 
subtraction from any other Individual's consunption of that good . . . ." 
^For elaboration of the welfare maximizing aspects of the competitive 
model, see, e.g., Bator (U, pp. 22-59) or Koopmans (53, pp. kl-96). 
^See Bator (3). 
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% -tùiien dosonstrates that the usual conditions for a Fareto-optimum, i.e., 
equality between the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates 
of transformation no longer hold. Rather, the necessary condition for 
optinallty lAen a public good is involved is equality between the marginal 
rate of transformation and the sum of the marginal rates of substitutions 
of aU consumers of the good. The impact of these changed conditions is 
the havoc they play vith the ability of a competitive market to congiute 
the optimal conditions. Samuelson can envisage restoring optimality 
through a highly idealized multiple pricing system, but concedes that even 
this system irould fail because persons would not reveal their true prefexw 
ences. 
As previously mentioned, externalities are said to exist idien there 
is interdependence among production (utilily) functions. Viewed in the 
broadest sense such a definition is of little help, since we know, for 
example, that in a Walrasian general equilibrium model, "everything 
depends iqpon everything else". Since extemalities cast in this frame­
work are all pervading, a more restrictive definition is required, one 
that focuses on the relevancy of the externality. It was this need that 
led Buchanan and Stubblebine (lit) to differentiate among "types" of 
externalities and attenmt to defiize the term rigorously and precisely. 
%ey begin in the usual way by defining an external effect to be 
present lAen an activity under the control of another appears as an argur 
ment in an individual's utility (production) function. They then define 
"krhe cases for production and consungption are symnetric, and there is 
no need to distinguish between them (lU, p. 371). 
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a potentially relevant externality to exist "... lAen the activity, to 
the extent that it is acttisOly performed, generates any desire on the part 
of the externally benefited (damaged) party to modify the behavior of the 
party empowered to take action throu^ trade, persuasion, compromise, 
agreement, convention, collective action, etc." (lit, pp. 37>7U)» Note 
that if the externality generates no such desire, it is termed irrelevant,, 
althou^ it still exists. There remains the task of distinguishing 
between the desire to modify the behavior of another and the ability to do 
so. The acting party will modify his behavior lAen the externally 
affected party can be made better-off without making the acting party 
worse off, that is, "gains from trade" are possible. Buchanan and 
Stubblebine define this situation as a Pareto-relevant externality (Hi, 
p. 37h). They go on to point out that when economists state that exteiv 
nalities have been eliminated at the Pareto-optimal position, only Pareto-
relevant externalities are being considered. Thus, all externalities are 
not elMnated at Pareto equilibrium. The significance of this point for 
policy decision is that "... there is not a prima facie case for inter­
vention in all cases where an extemaUiy is observed to exist" (lU, 
p. 381). 
Two questions may now be posed, first, idiat is the relationship 
between externalities and public goodsSecond, under what conditions 
can a case be made for public intervention into activities in a market 
econory? The following paragraphs attempt to answer these questions. 
a recent paper Meyer (60) has done much to clarify the terms 
"public goods", "externalities", and "joint stçply". 
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A -welfare economist and a specialist in public eoqaenditure analysis 
probably woiQ.d not give identical answers to the first question. However^ 
any apparent differences between the two specialties can be explained in 
part as a mitter of semantics and i)art]y as a matter of enqohasis. Bator 
(3^ pp. 363-371)5 presenting the welfare point of view, cites three causes 
of market failure: (1) ownership externalities that arise from non^opro-
priabilityj (2) technical externalities, characterized by indivisibilities 
or increasing returns to scale; and (3) public good externalities, as 
defined by Samuelson, lAich are characterized by joint consunption. Head 
(32, pp. 200-206), in a survey article in a public finance journal, asserts 
that the two main characteristics of Samuelsonien public goods are 
(1) jointness, i.e., indivisibility, and (2) nonappropriabllity and, 
hence, the impossibility of price exclusion. He then raises the question 
lAether jointness and exclusion are conceptually distinct, r^ated in some 
way, or even identical. His conclusion is that th^y "are conceptually 
quite distinct properties of Samuelson's public good, and are in no way 
related" (32, p. 210). Head points out that exclusion need not be techni­
cally inpossible; it is necessary only that it be uneconomic or infeasi-
ble. 
It should be recognized that declaring both jointness and exclusion 
to be characteriatics of pure public goods is Head* s conclusion, not 
Samuelson's. From his first paper on the subject, Samuelson (76, p. 38?) 
defined collective consumption goods to embrace only what has been termed 
here "jointness", i.e., consumption of the good by one individual in no 
way reduces the amount available to all others. 
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Is there a basic conflict here between the two areas of economic 
thâory? The answer appears to be that there is none. Any differences 
would sem to l:Le in the extension of the analyses to policy prescrip-
tions. Baumol (5^ p. 20) points out that the "new theoiy of public 
finance" is concerned with the analysis of the supiùy of public services 
and that it was natural to turn to welfare analysis and the theory of 
externalities to help explain why certain goods must be publically pro­
vided. 
The welfare analysis (including Samuelson's work) develops the ma» 
g-twAi conditions for achieving the Fareto-optlDial utility frontier for a 
system that includes specification of the optimal provision of public 
goods. Beyond this point the welfare economist has little to say. 
Samuelson (76) calls attention to three obstacles that block extension of 
the analysis: (1) to specify a "best" point among the infinity of points 
on the utility frontier requires the specification of a social welfare 
function; (2) no market pricing mechanism is capable of detemdning the 
distribution of the cost burden of a public good; (3) consumers have no 
incentive to reveal their true (demand) preferences for public goods. 
Among public expenditure analysts there is a grovqp that concerns it­
self with vhat Samuelson (76, p. 389) terns "welfare politics" and what 
Buchanan (13, p. 350) characterizes as "positive political economy". 
These specialists focus on alternative voting processes and institutional 
arrangements for the provision of goods and services having a large degree 
of "publicness". 
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Before moving to the matter of public intervention in the market 
mechanism, the conc^ts of eoctemalities and public goods must be related 
to water quality and -water pollution. 
Stated most 8inp]y, water pollution is essentially an externalities 
problem, idiereas water quality is a public consunption good. What this 
delineation suggests is that pollution is a "problem" because of inter-
dependencies among water users, and because of the publicness inherent in 
pollution abatement, market forces will not bring about the necessary 
corrective moves. To see that this is so, considm" the following points. 
Recalling the discussion of a public good, it was suggested that such 
goods are characterized by "jointness". As Boyd (10, p. 201;) points out, 
. . this means that ascertaining benefits f^ont public goods, in compar­
ison to benefits foregone by devoting resources to th^ production rather 
than to some alternative use (i.e., opportunity cost), is extremely diffi­
cult." If the incremental benefits of water quality cannot accurately be 
determined, a water management authority may turn to the criteria of 
achieving a certain level of water quality at least cost (10, p. 208). 
This is the position adopted for this study. 
Viewing pollution as a problem in eactemalities suggests that market 
forces cannot deal with them and, if they are of the Pareto-relevant type, 
possibilities exist for reducing or eliminating them. The next section 
su^ests reasons that any reduction or elimination may require public 
intervention rather than voluntary action. 
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The case for public intervention 
Vlhat case can be built for public intervention into a market economy, 
especially in view of Buchanan's "warning that the mere existence of exter­
nal effects is not sufficient cause for such intervention? The question 
is particularly relevant since not everyone shares the welfare economists' 
gloom over the apparent Inability of the market ^tem to cope with exter­
nalities.^ However g the conditions associated with basii^-wide -water 
pollution problems would seem to negate the possibility of market solu­
tions. first of all, the possibility of voluntary action is remote 
because of the large numbers of individuals usually involved. Thus, one 
does not find the "small numbers" situation and the costless operation of 
the price system frequently assumed by "free market" advocates. Also, 
Kneese and Bower (52, pp. 89-90) point out that the weak technical and 
spatial ties between production and consunption units within a basin 
lessen the prospects for internalizing technical externalities. throu^ 
merger, the "remedy" offered by some writers. 
Irie are led, then, to the conclusion that any arrangement for optimal 
resource management, including the level of pollution that will exist, 
"Mill of necessity include the "Visible Hand" of government. 
In summary, the orthodox model of perfect con^tition, as it has 
developed within the Anglo-American tradition, assumes away interdepend-
encies amoiv; consuming and producing units. As a result the theory is not 
capable of dealing vith external effects. Samuelson's "rediscovery" of 
concept of the "public good" provides a polar case for analyzing those 
^ee, e.g., Baumol's review essay ($, pp. 19-36). 
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goods and services that «132. not be provided by decentralized market 
mechanisms. Modem (i.e., post-l^ôO) exbemaHty theory has fairly well 
demolished the tax-bounty solution for dealing with external effects.^ 
The mere existence of exbemalltles does not necessarily suggest the need 
for public intervention. However, it is clear that amy degree of publlc-
ness severely hinders the possibility of a market solution. For the large 
number case the prospects of voluntary action are nil. Governmental 
involvement cannot be avoided. The focus of the analysis of such involve­
ment Is more on the institutional arrangements and the role of the politi­
cal processes than on efficiency criteria. A discussion of Idie structural 
dimension of the problem is the subject of the next section. 
The Structural Dimension 
Continuing the examination of the three-fold framework for analyzing 
water pollution problems, considération Is given now to the matter of 
structural or institutional arrangements. The terms "institution" or 
"structure" are taken to meai) "... group control exercised on and In 
making and carrying out individual and group decisions" (89, p. 169). 
Subsumed under these terms are laws, customs of a culture, organizational 
structure of society, and other group control over individual behavior 
(92, p. 668). 
For a particular problematic situation, the existing structures may 
either facilitate or inhibit the attainment of the desired level of water 
quality. Further, the inability to cope adequately with a problem may 
^ee Turvey's succinct summary of the major pîçiers in this literature (93). 
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result from failure to promote or enact potentially enabling structures. 
Thus, the institutional set may be an important failure element in a 
problem situation, because it is either incomplete or inadequate. 
AH too frequently, economic theorists abstract from institutional 
ccnsiderations.^ In this study, the existing structural set relevant to 
vater pollution vill not be "taken as given". Rather, institutions Kill 
be viewed as variables and the investigation will focus on how they impact 
on the affected parties. Such an approach is essential in the face of the 
findings of the previous section that market forces will not operate to 
alleviate problems arising from external diseconomies, and non-market 
approaches must be used. 
Structural criteria 
Vlhen considering the physical and economic dimensions of the poUur 
tion problem, it was possible to specify, at least conc^tually, effi­
ciency or qptimality criteria. It would be helpful if similar criteria 
could be specified for structures. Unfortunately, no such precise 
criteria can be developed. However, it is possible to surest certain 
ends one hopes to achieve via the institutional framework. Such "insti­
tutional criteria" have been suggested in the literature, 
Allen Kneese is a strong advocate of managing water quality on a 
regional basis. In his most recent book, he and his co-author, Blair 
Bower, suggest six criteria which they feel "... efficient regional 
management agencies (river-baWin or state) should meet": 
^See, e.g., HLcks (33, p. 7). 
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1. The regional agency should internalize the major eactemallties 
associated with waste discharges to the watercourses of a region. 
2. The regional agency should be able to inclement all relevant 
measures to iinprove water quality. 
3. The regional agency should be able to take adequate account of 
the interrelationship between water qualily and other aspects of 
imter resource development and use. 
il. The regional agency should be able to take adequate account of 
the interrelation^p between water quality management and land use 
management. 
5. The regional agency should be able to take adequate account of 
the interrelationship between water quality management and iiopacts on 
other aspects of environmental quality, 
6. The regional agency should provide an opportunity for affected 
parties to have a voice in decisions. (52, pp. 303-308) 
Clearly such criteria envisage a management authority with wide powers to 
deal not oxûy with water quality, but also the related matters of water 
quantity, and air and land use. Ho such agency exists at this time. 3h 
fact, the authors conclude their discussion of the criteria with the 
comment, "one of the least understood questions in regard to water quality 
and overall water resources management is how the agency's political 
structure can be arranged so that it is conducive to efficiency and 
equity" (52, p. 308). 
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Ijyle Graln&a, in a recent study of the English -water management 
system^ suggests six criteria that he describes as "essential charac­
teristics of institutional arrangements": 
1, Ability to apply the total range of governmental techniques for 
influencing water use and develcpnent, 
2. Ability to consider and adjust (or adapt to) esctemalities 
stemming from hydrologie interdependencies. 
3» Flexibility to adapt water management actions to different 
circumstances of time and jûace with protection against arbitrary 
and capricious actions. 
U« Ability to express and consider the range of values relevant to 
a water managemezrb decision. 
5. Ability to finance water management consistent with its objective 
of efficiency. 
6. The extent to which water management is recognized and built into 
government as a continuing function. (17, pp. 19-22) 
Imbedded in Cra±ne*s criteria is a belief in the regional approach to 
management that involves government to a great extent, and a stress on 
flexibility, continuity, and participation of the affected parties. There 
is considerable overlap between the Kheese and Bower and the Craine 
criteria. Some differences in emphasis is evident, however. Bieese and 
Bower emphasize as far as practical an all-enconpassing hydrologie unit^ 
and are concerned mth related environmental factors. Graine (17, pp. 21-
22) recognizes that "regional disconformities" may exist among hydrologie 
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supply unitSf demand units^ and political units^ and so^ests institu­
tional means of handling such problems. 
Integration of the two sets of criteria will provide a basis for 
evaluating alternative institutional arrangements suggested in this study. 
The following criteria are proposed for use in the present work. 
1. The water management entity should encompass the major sup^ùy and 
use areas, and thus account for the major interactions. 
2. The water management entity should be of sufficient size to 
(a) provide an adequate financial base, and (b) take advantage of 
any scale economies in waste treatment or water simply systems. 
3. The water management agency should have a wide range of water 
quality inprovement techniques available to it. 
U. Water quality should be managed jointly with water quantity and 
the relevant associated land areas. 
5. Values r^resenting the preferences of supply areas, use areas, 
and political entities should be determined and expressed in water 
management decisions. 
It is felt that these five "criteria" will serve as an adequate basis for 
appraising the adequacy of various structures. 
Structural alternatives 
Much has been written in the economic literature about the dissoci­
ation of costs and benefits in the presence of externalities, and the need 
for "internalizing" such external effects. Because of the migratory 
nature of surface waters and the "jointness" or public good nature of 
water quality, it should be noted that benefit and cost dissociations 
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also occur with -water quality improvement. There is nothing in positive 
economic theory that offers answers to the questions of how water quality 
improvement projects are to be financed and who is to bear the costs. 
(Welfare theory begs the question by proposing efficiency criteria that 
require equating marginal costs, i.e., opportunities foregone, and 
generally iinquantifiable marginal benefits, and equity considerations that 
require specification of a social welfare function.) 
The trend toward regionalization Since the development of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority much of the water resource planning in the 
Ikiited States has focxised on major river basins. At the other end of the 
spectrum a number of studies, notably those under the direction of Pro­
fessor John Tinmons (70, 87) at Iowa State University, have dealt with 
watershed planning. The position taken in this study is that neither 
major river basins nor watersheds are of the proper size for cco^rehensive 
water management; the latter because they are too small to encompass 
significant siqpplLes or demands; the former because of significant admin­
istrative and/or political conqplexities. If the basin and the watershed 
are viewed as polar extremes of a continuum, there should exist within the 
continuum one (or more) water management \init(s) that meets the criteria 
specified in previous section. Close scrutiny of the criteria reveals the 
presmption that water resources will be managed on a regionalized basis. 
This is in keying with the trend found not only in the United States but 
also in Western Europe, where planners have recognized that in order to 
deal with hydrologie interdependencies, involvement of numerdus goven»* 
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mental entities, and to esqploit possible scale economies, they must turn 
to TnanngHng water resources on a regional basis 
In the most gextaral sense a region may be defined as a subarea of the 
nation. However, for purposes of analysis it is usually preferable to 
develop the region from aggregating contiguous subrogions. Two possible 
delineations of water resource regions, one based on hydrologie boundries 
and the other on boundries of existing (or potential) governmental units, 
are suggested in figure 3. The figure calls attention to two points. 
first, the two delineations are not completely independent; some inter­
action exists. Second, a hierarchy of region sizes is more apparent idien 
dealing with hydrologically defined areas than \ihen governmental entities 
are considered. One may easily visualize an intrastate river basin as a 
"region", imde up of its comqponent watersheds anchor hydrologically 
delineated special districts. SimHardily a conservancy district, following 
the ridge lines of a major drainage area and enconpassing several small 
river basins, can be considered a region. When one attempts to define a 
region along governmental boundaries, complications arise. Economic 
activity and economic lliikages between centers of production or consumption 
(that may lie in different hydrologie units) must be taken into consider^ 
atlon iAen formulating the "region". For certain types of analysis such a 
conc^t of a region is necessary. However, when dealing primarily wiiji 
water pollution problems, hydrologically defined regions will suffice. 
For an excellent summary of the different Institutional and organi­
zational approaches to managing water quality on a regional basis followed 
in several countries, see Chapter 13 in Kheese and Bower (52). : 
Hydrologie Areas Governmental Units 
Major River Basin 
^ — 
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e 
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Special 
Districts 
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Special 
Districts 
Economic 
River 
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Figure 3. Hierarchy of alternative regional delineations for water quality managenisnt 
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This is possible since the principal linkages associated with water pollu­
tion are physical rather than economic, i.e., movement through the surface 
-Natercourse. The present study, with its esiphasis on pollution abatement, 
w<n focus on hydrologicalHy defined regions. Such a choice does not 
preclude consideration of the disconformities existing among stçpply, use, 
and political entities. Rather, a major objective of the analysis is to 
devise structural means for ameliorating problems arising from the exist­
ence of disconformities within a hydrologie area. 
How large should a region be? The answer to this question dep^ds, 
in general, on two considerations. First, it is necessary to detennine 
the -t^ade-offs that exist between meeting the "institutional criteria" and 
the administrative and political complexities associated with increasing 
size. Second, size of region is related to the objective or end sou^t. 
Reviewing the possible hydrologicaUy based regions shown in Figure 3, the 
major river basin and the watershed (and small special districts, e.g., 
drainage districts) have already been excluded from consideration. In 
this study we shall focus on an intrastate river basin as the region. 
This choice was made for the sake of simplicity and convenience in pre­
senting the analytic approach. No difficulties are seen in extending the 
approach to a "re^on" encompassing the entire stateHowever, such an 
extension will not be made in the engpirical portion of this study. 
Presumably the same approach would apply to interstate compacts, but 
as Hlnes (3#, pp. WiS-Ll*?) has pointed out, the political complexities of 
^See Graine (17), especially Chapter 6, for a discussion of the 
possibility of a state as the overriding authority for a group of sub-
regions based on intrastate, basins. 
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forming such a unit are substantial. Therefore, regions of this magnitude 
will not be considered here. 
Orgànizational options Society, through its structuring of polit­
ical and administrative entities, decrees who shall bear the cost of the 
services provided by the entity. In the absence of damage functions, 
benefit functions, welfare functions, and the like, normative economic 
doctrine has little to say about who should pay. This study will examine 
three organizational arrangements for water quality management. Specifi­
cally, (1) the case in which the polluter bears the cost, (2) that in 
which the user bears the cost, and (3) that in which the general public 
bears the cost will be studied. Each of the organizational arrangements 
will differ in its ability to satisfy the institutional criteria. They 
will differ also as to their political attractiveness and administrative 
ease. The different institutional arrangements will be examined in Chap­
ter 7. 
Need for a Multidiscipliuary Approach 
Prom the preceding discussion of the magnitude, complexity, and 
dimensions of the problem of water pollution from agricultural sources, it 
is clear that no single scientific discipline can hope to cope with it 
completely and satisfactorily. A thorough analysis will require the tal­
ents of soil scientists, hydrologists, limnologists, as well as specialists 
in law, economics and political science. Moreover, it is essential that 
the efforts of the various disciplines be truly integrated rather than what 
Timmons has characterized as "layering knowledge". He points out that much 
multidisciplinary research is "characterized by piecemeal if not hodge­
I 
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podge conglomerates of knowledge" (90, p. 28). In addition to the "layer­
ing" problems, Timmons suggests that nultidisciplinary research efforts 
must deal with technological difficulties, identification of problems in a 
manner that is clear to all disciplines, inadequate integration of objec­
tives, différences in approaches to inqiilry and administrative difficulties 
(90, pp. 27-30). There is some evidence that the problems plaguing inte­
grated research have been at least partially overcome. The most striking 
exa#les includs the work of fbass and his associates in the Harvard Water 
Program (53) and the recent monograph hy Davis (18). 
The present study -will rely heavily tçon the counsel of specialists 
in the areas of soil erosion and soil conservation, sediment transport, 
and pollution abatement techniques. It is felt that with such consul­
tation the resultant economic analysis will be strengthened and a foun­
dation laid for further research on a multidisclplinary basis. 
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CHAPTER ni. DEVËLOFHENT OF THE MODEL 
This cluster is devoted to developing in sane detail the analytic 
framework idLthin lAieh the three objectives of the stixdy may be pursued. 
Sediment and the substances carried with it serve as the "demonstration" 
potential pollutants. Application of the model to a study area is 
presented in Chapter IV. 
The essential points of the proposed framework are as follows. A 
hydrologie model relating pollution source, transmission mechanism and 
point of impact is specified, based on relationships taken Arom the 
physical sciences. A linear programming constrained cost minimization 
model is developed, using the various water quality inprovement techniques 
described in Chapter II as activities. Combining the two systems provides 
the least-cost solutions for achieving a specified level of water quality. 
Finally, alternative structural arrangements are posited and their practi­
cability as cost-sharing schemes evaluated. 
The Physical Framework 
Water pollution by sediment and control of such pollution, modeled as 
a purely physical system, is shown diagramatically in figure U* 
Among the numerous hydrologie interrelationships suggested in Figure 
U are several that must be ^ ecified exogenously if the problem is to be 
made tractable. In the source component of the model, rainfall, soil type, 
and land slope are fixed. Within the linkage system the delivery ratio 
and stream flow rate are specified. At the impact point the quantity and 
quality values for both in-stream and off-strean uses are set. Only land 
figure U. Schematic representation of sediment as a potential pollutant 
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use will be viewed as a variable in the model. This follows from the 
fact that one of the main sets of water quality Improvemant techniques 
includes land practices. In addition, the fixed factors relate primarily 
to relationships taken from the physical sciences and thich require 
sinqplif^^ing assumptions. 
Figure k and the fixed factors siqiply the necessary information for 
achieving the first stu^y objective. The relationships in the figure and 
the fixed factors specify a water supply of a given quality (in terms of 
a sin^e parameter, sediment) and quantity; the linkage system is defined; 
and danands with specific quantity and quality requirements are indicated. 
Jî -Uie possibillly of the water supply being of pristine quality is 
assumed away, one would expect to find a divergence between the existing 
stream quality and the exogenously specified demmads. Objective one seeks 
means for eliminating such divergence. The means required for the task 
are to be found in the alternative pollution abatement techniques shown in 
figure h and discussed in Chapter U. Quite simply, the water quality 
needed for a particular purpose is obtained from a siqpply of given quality 
by adjusting the quality of the supply tqoward through removal of the pollu­
tant at the point of use, or in the watercourse, or by preventing the 
pollutant from ever entering the stream. In addition, alternative supplies 
may be considered. Vlhich approach should be taken? At this point no 
answer founded on economic considerations can be ^ven. The reason is 
that the analysis is operating within a physical Aramework and, thus, there 
are no criteria for guiding choice. A choice mechanism based on cost is 
developed in the next section^ 
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Â Constrained Cost Minimization Model 
Referring again to Hgure lij the pollution abatement techniques 
suppSy the alternative means of enhancing water quality. Which of the 
techniques to use and the extent to t^ch thsy should be employed depends 
içon (1) the lev^ of water quality desired, (2) the unit cost of each 
technique, and (3) the per unit effectiveness, i.e., input-output coef­
ficient, of each technique. If the cost and technical coefficients of the 
various methods can be determined, each of the techniques may be viewed as 
an activity, and linear programming is the obvious analytical tool to 
employ. Linear programming has been used successfully in a nmter of 
studies dealing with managing water quality (19, 73, 82). Most of 
these studies have focused on dissolved ocxygen (DO) as the quality param­
eter of interest. However, Sobel (82, p. U79), citing Thiemann's work, 
assents that "... turbidity can be mod^jed as linear system outputs more 
easily lâtan can DO." Thus, it would appear that there is good justifi­
cation for using linear programming methods in the present study. 
Formulating the linear program 
A problem that can be cast in the form 
Minimize z • c^x^ + 02*2 '•'••• (la) 
subject to a^jX^ + ••• + ^ 
a^*l * ••• ^ ^m» 
^ 0,...,3{^ ^  0, 
is termed a linear programming problem. Within the context of the present 
study the components of the system of equations have the following meaning. 
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The bundle of alternative water quaZity inçrovement techniques are 
represented by the column vector, X " (Xj), j " 1,..., n. Associated with 
each technique is the cost per unit of quality improvement, c^. The set 
of unit costs is denoted by a row vector, 0 " (cy), j - 1,..., n. Using 
matrix notation, the objective function may be stated as: 
Ifijiimize Z « CX. (2) 
Equation 2 states that the objective of the problem is to find the least 
cost]y mix of quality improvement methods. 
Each land practice, engineering structure, and engineering practice, 
i.e., each Xj, has associated with it a constant coefficient that ^ cifies 
the turbidity contribution per unit of Xj. These coefficients are r^re-
sented by the a^j in equation lb. The vector of b^*s constitute the 
various constraints that we may wish to impose. By way of illustration, 
let b^ be the turbidilgr level desired for the water uses under consider­
ation. The remaining m.1 of the bj^ are restrictions on the level to lAich 
a technique may be eD#.oyed. For example, if terracing is permitted only 
land with a slope greater than five percent, then the restriction would 
state that the terracing activity must not exceed the amount of land area 
with such, a slope. In general, these restraints will be of the form "less 
than or equal to". Thus, for our problem the set of constraint inequali­
ties will take the form: 
* % * - * \ (3) 
Xj ^  0, J " 1,...,n. 
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Certain of the rows in equation 3 must be strict equalities. This 
irfn assure that some activities enter the optional solution at positive 
(non-zero) levels, dearly^ in a minimization problem, if all the 
restrictions are of the form "less than or equal to", the minimum cost 
solution would have aU activities at zero, i.e., the least-cost solution 
is to do nothing! 
The system described by equations 2 and 3 is quite general and can be 
adapted to examine a number of facets of the problem. Fbr example, the 
quality constraint, b^, can be assigned successively more stringent values 
and comparison of the solutions will indicate the incremental costs of 
achieving higher and higher quality levels in the watercourse. In addi­
tion, it will be possible to calculate the least-cost means of meeting the 
quality requirements of off-stream uses wtiere part of the improvement is 
accomplished instream and part at the point of use. The cost figures so 
generated will be of interest in policy determinations of "proper" stream 
standards. 
Essentially, the approach proposed is a cost-effectiveness model in 
which we seek to: 
Minimize C (q) for q - q^, (U) 
-where q is a vector of quality levels that is varied parametrically and 
C (q) is the abateanent cost function. The solutions give the value of C 
and an efficient set of control techniques for each q. 
The number of activities to be included in the program turns out to be 
sommAat less than one mi^t have surmised from the discussion of tJie 
physical control of sediment in Chapter H. The reason for this constric­
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ting effect is explained primarily by technological factors. For exangiLe, 
instream treatment is still largely experimental and is constrained to 
maximum flow rates well below that assurai for the study. Even more 
telling is the cost insensitivity of certain engineering practices to 
quality of the raw water rnqqily. Therefore ^ pollution abatement techniques 
for certain off-stream uses are not included in the program because of the 
clear dominance of one "activity" over a wide (nearly jOO-fold) range of 
quality levels. Calculations involving these practices are easily made as 
an addendum to the prograzming results. The net result is that the 
ezq)irical complexities are singilified but the conc^tual approach is not 
altered. 
The activities for the linear program are developed and the program­
ming results reported in the next chapter. Mtematlve institutional and 
organizational arrangements are developed in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER 17. APPLICATION OF THE WDEL 
The Study Area 
The area selected for demonstrating use of the analytic Framework 
described in Chapter IH is the Nishnabotoa River Basin (Figure 5). 
Located in southwestern Iowa within the Missouri River Basin, the Nishna-
botna Basin has a drainage area of 2,819 square miles to the Missouz-i 
state line (55, p. 3). Only that portion of the basin lying vithin Iowa 
(approximately 95^) will be considered in this stuc^r. 
The NLshnabotna Basin lies almost entirely within the Marshall soil 
association area (L6, p. 3). The topography of the area ranges from 
gently to strongly sloping. Marshall silty clay loam is the predominant 
soil type found in the soil association. The Marshall soils dev^oped 
from loess with prairie as the original vegetation (69, p. 52). Such 
soils are characterized by hi^ productivity and high erodability (U6, 
p. 5). 
Land use data for the study area were obtained from the Soil Conser­
vation Service data bank maintained at the Statistical Laboratory, Iowa 
State IMversity. As yet unpublished, these data constitute an iqxiating 
to 1967 of the 1958 Conservation Needs Inventory (Wt, p. 95) • The iwrei>-
tory process involves taking three stratified random samples, I60 acres in 
area, from each township in a county. This gives a sampling rate of 
approximately two percent. Land use data by land capability class are 
determined for each sample arpa and the data extended to give total acre­
ages for the county or other geographic area, e.g., a river basin as was 
figure S. The Nishnabotna Hiver Basin 
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done for the present stucty.^ It should be noted that the iznrentory 
excludes federal lands, urban areas, and water areas. 
Sunnary data for the Nishnabotna Basin by capability class and the 
erosion hazard subclass as supplied by the Statistical laboratory are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 indicates that slightly more than 1.75 million acres or 
approximately 2,739 square miles of land are included in the inventory. 
With the basin having an area of 2,819 square miles, more than 97 percent 
of the basin is included in the inventory. 
Because the focus of this study is on pollutants from the agricul­
tural sector, only the lands falling in the use categories "cropland" and 
"pasture-range" vill be considered. As calculated from Table 1, these 
categories contain 83.5 percent and 10.8 percent, reapectiveGiy, or more 
than 9h percent of the lands included in the inventory. More than 72 per­
cent of cropland falls in the erosion hazard subclass, while 65 percent of 
the pasture and rangeland is in this subclass. 
Estimating Erosion Rates 
Use of the universal soil-loss equation and some of its limitations 
were discussed in the section dealing "with the physical dimension of the 
problem in Chapter II. Since the present work does not seek precise 
quantitative estimates of soil losses in the Mshnabotna Basin, but rather 
a means for coiiparing alternative erosion control techniques, use of the 
Ipor a more detailed discussion of the san^ling procedures used and 
the land capability classification ^ tem, see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
in Iowa Soil and Water Conservation Needs Inventory (Wt, pp. 61-68). 
Table 1, Nishnabotna River Basins-use of inventory acreage by land oapaibilily class and subclass 
Class 
and 
subclass 
Slope 
gradient* 
(percent) 
CSropland 
(1000 acres) 
Pasture-
rangeland 
(1000 acres) 
Forest-
woodland 
(1000 acres) 
Other land 
(1000 acres) 
Total 
(1000 acres) 
I 0- 1.9 105.0 9.0 8.3 1.7 127.0 
n 2,0- 1.9 527.6 70.9 5.U 20.1 62U.O 
E 279.7 20.7 2.5 lU.it 316.9 
in 2.0-13.9 70b.l 63.7 6.1 23.5 779.L 
£ 662,h 60.8 5.5 21.3 750.0 
17 lU.0-19.9 88.2 21.1 3.1 1.5 rm.2 
E 87.2 21.1 3.U 1.5 113.2 
V — 9.1 3.U 3.h 0.8 16.8^ 
VI 20.0-29.9 2I1.3 15.7 6.8 0.8 U7.7 
E 22.0 15.7 6.8 0.6 1*5.1 
VII 30.0 + 5.6 U.9 9.1 6.6 26.2 
. E 5.1; lt.9 9.1 6.6 26.0 
Class totals l,U6li.O 188.7 b2.6 58.0 1,753.3 
Subclass E totals 1,056.7 122.7 27.4 UU.U 1,251.3 
%oldenhauer, W. C., A.R.8.-n.S.D.A., Ames, Iowa. Slope gradient ranges associated vith each 
capability class for Marshall soil association. Arivate communication. February 10, 1970. 
^Excluded from study. 
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"universal equatian" seems justified. To reiterate a point made previ­
ously, the results obtained are not directly applicable to the Mshnabotna 
Basin as it existed in 196? (or at amy other point in time for that 
matter). Rather, the physical entity developed is an amalgam of certain 
data taken frcsn the basin and a series of rather stringent assumptions, 
with the product being subject to all the limitations of applying the 
universal equation to a large geogrtq;Mc area. 
%e soilmloss equation 
The soil-loss equation states that A, the conpited soil loss expressed 
in tons per acre per year, equals the product of tiie following factors: 
R, the rainfall factor, 
K, the soil-erodibility factor, 
L, the slop^length factor, 
S, the slope-gradient factor, 
C, the cropping management factor, and 
P, the erosion^control practice factor (US, p. 3). 
Since the K-factor is developed for soils under cultivated continuous 
fallow, the value of MIS gives the average annual soil loss if the area 
under consideration is assumed to be in continuous fallow. Clearly, 
erosion will be at a maximum under such conditions. Erosion rates are 
reduced throu^ crop management and erosion control practices, i.e., 
C < 1, P < 1. 
Factor values 
The Rr-factor is assigned a value of 170 for the stu^y. This value 
was interpolated for the midpoint of the basin from the iso-erodent curves 
in figure 1 of Wlschm&ier and Smith (11$, pp. 6-7). 
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For purposes of the study, the simpllQplmg assumption is made that 
all of the soil within the basin is Marshall silty clay loam. The K-
factor for this soil type is 0.33 (115, Table 1, p. 5). 
The L and S factors may be expressed by a single value to give the 
s]jDpe effect. The 16 factor is calculated by the expression: 
IS - fl(0.0076 + 0.0053s + 0.00076s2) (5) 
trtiere f is the slope length in feet, and s is the slope gradient expressed 
in percent (115, p. 9). The s values used in the confutation were the mid­
point values of the slope gradient ranges associated with each capability 
class.l The f values selected were 300 feet for capability classes 1 and 
H and 600 feet for classes III, 17, VI, and VU. These values were 
chosen after inspection of aerial soil survey lAotographs of several 
counties in the basin. The inspection revealed a remarkable consistency 
between lands of five percent slope or less and slope lengths of about 300 
feet, and 600 foot slope length with lands of slope gradient greater than 
p 
five percent. The slope effect values used in the study are given in 
Table 2. 
Values for the G-factor and the B-factor will be specified -«rhen the 
various activities are developed later. 
^Ihe one exception was for capability class VU (slope gradient 30^ or 
greater). The value assigned to this class was 30^ since this is the maxi­
mum slope usually associated with the Marshall association (69, pp. 52-53). 
^Moldenhauer, W. C., A.R.S.-U.S.D^A,., kma, Iowa. Slope lengths in 
the Klshnabotna Basin. Private conmunicatian. March It, 1970. 
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Table 2. Slope effect factors (l£) by capability class for certain slope 
gradients and slope lengths 
Capability 
class 
Slope 
gradient 
(A 
Slope length (ft.) 
118 138 188 300 600 
I 1.0 0.237 
n 3.S 0.61U 
U.o 0.562 
in 9.5 3.100 
10.0 1.605 
17 17.0 7.773 
18.0 3.79a 
VI 25.0 15.067 
vn 30.0 17.133 
Some Simplifying Assumptions 
Reference has been made earlier to the need for certain sdnpLif^srLng 
assunptions in the face of less than fuU knowledge of all the factors 
relating to soil erosion and sediment transport. The nature of the avail­
able land use and hydrologie data make further simplifications necessary. 
land characteristics 
One assumption already stated is that aU the land in the basin is 
assumied to be Marshall silty clay loam. Another regarding topography has 
been mientioned. Specifically^ the slope gradient within each land capar* 
bility class is assigned the midpoint value for the class range shown in 
Table 1. In view of the hi^ aggregative nature of the basic data used in 
the analysis, namely acreages in each land capability class, no rational 
/ 
means for axy finer breakdown of slope gradients within each class could 
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be developed. (Hven the goal of developing a basin-vide system, use of 
ni<%)oint values would not seem to introduce azy serious distortions. 
land use 
For purposes of the anaOysis all acreages reported in the Conser­
vation Needs Inventory (CNI) data as "cropland" and "pasture and range" 
have been combined into a single value for each capability class. This 
consolidation is justified on the basis that (1) the CNI survey reported 
how the land was being used rather than how it could be used, and (2) 
there is considerable overlap in the CNI definitions of the two types of 
land use.^ 
The only land uses allowed in the program are a com-com-soybean 
rotation or permanent pasture. This is an attempt to recognize the 
realities of existing commercial agriculture in the basin tempered with 
best agronomic advice. Continuous row cropping of the type suggested 
rather than sod-based rotations seems to be in use in the basin where 
practical (and even in sane areas lAere expert opinion would dictate other 
p 
land uses). At iAe same time the recommendations of soil scientists that 
the more steqply sloped c^ability classes are basically not suited for 
row crops has been recognized in the pasture alternative (I4I;, p. 66). In 
no case is amy cropland permitted to lie fallow year round. 
^ee the SCS memorandum regarding the CNI ijpdate (97, pp. 7-8). 
^This assertion was confirmed repeatedly in conversations with Iowa 
State I&iiversity research and extension agricultural engineers and 
agronomists having firsthand knowledge of agricultural practices in south­
western Iowa. J 
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B&rdrology and sediment yields 
QLven that the erosion rates estdioated ly the "universal equation" 
are long time (25 years or more) average annual values (115» p. 1(1) j 
similar long period annual averages are used for stream flow values and 
stream suspended sediment loads. Clearly precipitation patterns^ stream 
flow, and sediment loads are extremely complex phenomena and the variance 
associated with 25 year averages -will be quite large. However, this is an 
area where data as well as basic understanding are lacking. No alterna­
tive to the rather gross sisgolification of using long term averages -was 
apparent. Again, it may be pointed out that the basic point of the study 
is in the approach rather than the enpirical findings. From this perspec­
tive, concealing a set of complex physical relationships under a veil of 
sinqple averages is less disturbing. 
Fana production units 
In order to develop seme of tAe activities fox* the program it 
is necessary to have knowledge of size of farms in the basin. Agricultural 
Census data are of little help because (1) the information is reported on 
a county basis, and (2) the definition of a "farm" used in the census 
really is not relevant to commercial agriculture. Therefore, it was 
decided to work -with hypothetical units having h50 acres of crop land and 
-the ability to generate gross revenues of the order of thirty thousand to 
forty-five thousand dollars annually. A unit of this size is felt to be 
representative of viable commercial farm en-tezprises that are coming to 
typify modem agriculture. 
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Water uses 
The point of use of the watercourse is assumed to be located at the 
lower end of the basin. A fictional city of ten thousand population is 
assumed to be located there. It is the existence of the city that gener­
ates the potmtial use of the watercourse. Three in-stream and one off-
stream uses are considered. The specific ii>stream uses ares 
1. primary contact recreation ("swimming"), 
2. secondary contact recreation (warm water fish habitat), 
3. aesthetics. 
The sin^ off-stream use is for a municipal water siqoply. It is assumed 
that the municipal water stqpply plant wiU meet all domestic, industrial, 
and public demands of the city. 
The city is assumed to have four alternative sources Aran idxLch it 
may obtain its water supply. The cost of each will differ, first, the 
city could drill weUs at a point 3 miles from the city. Second, it could 
use the Hishnabotna River lAich is assumed to have a hi^ suspended sedi­
ment content. The transmission distance is 1 mile. Third, the Nishnar« 
botna with low turbidity resultdjng from igpland treatment could be used. 
This alternative is not the same as the second because the municipal treat­
ment plant facilities are less costly. Finally, a major river located 8 
miles from the city and having a very low turbidity level is available as 
a surface water supply. It should be noted that this stream could also 
meet the recreational demands. 
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Suspended sediment discharge 
AU. suspended sediment measurements are assumed to be made at the 
city and reflect the contribution of the total drainage area above the 
city. Thus, there is the assumption that all eroded soil that enters the 
watercourse is carried past the city. Further, it is assumed that soil 
erosion is occurring only on agricultural cropland. Therefore, other sedi­
ment sources such as industrial and residential sites, streambank erosion, 
and streanibed scour are ignored. 
The siinplified basin 
After making all the sinplif^dng assumptions described above, the 
basin has been reduced to a fairly simple entity. Essentially it can be 
viewed as an area of rolling cropland, dotted with contiguous LSO-acre 
homogenous production units. At its southern tip there is a city, past 
which flows the watercourse at a constant volume. The suspended sediment 
concentration in the watercourse varies with the extent and type of land 
use, land treatment practices, and engineering structures used on the 
cropland. 
Development of the Activities 
The activities used in the linear programs involve alternative till­
age methods alone and in combination with land treatment practices for the 
row crop rotation. In addition, activities involving moving land into 
permanent pasture and building of gully control structures are included. 
The several activities and the land capability classes in which they are 
permitted to enter are shown in Table 3. The twenty-nine activities 
Table 3. Activities in linear program 
Contouring Terraces QuUy 
control 
structures 
Capability 
class 
Conventional 
tillage 
Minimum 
tillage 
Conven. 
tillage 
Minimm 
tillage 
Conven. 
tillage 
HLnijnum 
tillage 
Permanent 
pasture 
I X® X X X X 
II X X X X X X X X 
in X X X X X X 
17 X X X X X X 
VI X X 
vn X X 
^ denotes activity allowed to be used in c€Q>ability class indicated. 
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relate exclusively to control of erosion at the source. This situation 
reflects the need for control at that point for ii>»stream uses as well as 
the need mentioned earlier for handling the "activities" associated with 
the off-stream use outside of the programming framework. 
For each activity there must be developed a physical or "input-output" 
coefficient specifying the amount of sediment contributed to (or he'id back 
from) the watercourse per unit of activity. The unit cost of each 
activity most be calculated also. Derivation of the physical coefficients 
and unit costs are described in the next section. The detailed calcu­
lations underlying the physical coefficients are given in Tables 10-16 in 
Appendix A. The detail behind the cost calculations may be found in 
Tables 19a^2$ of Appendix B. 
Tillage systems 
Two tillage systems are included. One, referred to as "conventional 
tillage", assumes the long practiced sequence of plow-disk-plant-hoe-
cultivate. The second, referred to as "minimiim tillage", is essentially a 
no-plow system. It combines ridge planting with high crop residues on the 
surface of the field, CroppiBg-management factors (C-f actors) for each 
system are calculated in Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix A. Once the C-factor 
values are established, computation of the erosion rates for each tillage 
system involves straight-forward application of the soil-loss prediction 
equation. The soil-loss rates for each of the four capability classes on 
which the row crop rotation is permitted are given in Table 12 of Appendix 
A. 
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It shmilcl be noted that each tillage system is assumed to operate "tqp 
and down the slope" without regard to contour. 
. Derivation of the costs of the tillage systems, lAether used alone or 
in combination with contouring or terraces, is somewhat more complex. 
Basically, the questions to be answered are of the sort "What is the cost 
of conventional tillage as compared with minimum tillage?" and "What is 
the cost of contouring?" It was decided that the principal variable of 
in^ortaace to the farm operator is the timeliness of performing certain 
crucial <qperations, e.g., planting. He knows for example that, in soutk. 
em Iowa, he will begin to wqwrience reductions in yields if his com 
planting is not completed by about May 12 and this in the face of weather 
uncertainties that can keep him out of the fields one or more days per 
week (b7. Table 1.2$, p. 31 and Table 1.28, p. 35)» specifying a 
starting date for lOanting and knowing the average number of days of £LeId 
time available before the "critical" date, it was possible to develop a 
set of machinery for the U50-acre unit that would allow completion of the 
various operations "on time". The equipment i^tem, operating times on 
"flatlands", i.e., land with slope less than 5 percent, and the associated 
variable and fixed costs are developed in Tables 19a and 19b of Appendix 
B. 
One would eaq>ect that minimum tillage would be less time consuming 
sold less expensive than conventional tillage since fewer operations are 
involved. Similarly, logic would suggest that field operations performed 
on sloping land would be more time consuming and thus more costly than 
similar operations on flatlands since tractors must operate a;|b slower 
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qpeeds on the slopes. These differences are quantified by applying Smith's 
finding that savings in fanning time averaged 2U percent for com and soy­
beans when parallel terraces were used instead of terraces having shorter 
row lengths and many "point rows" (81, p. 3U5)» Stated another way, it 
would take 32 percent longer to operate on non-parallel terraces than on 
parallel ones. Similar findings, although with a larger variance, have 
been reported by Mitchell and Beer (62)= The assunption is then made that 
flatland operating times are essentially the same as those for parallel 
terraces, lAile ccmtouring with fidd configurations similar to "conven­
tional" terraces and inland operations will require the same increase in 
the time required for field operations.^ The factw used to make the 
adjustment in both operating times and variable costs is Smith's 1.32. In 
this way total production costs can be developed tor the two tillage sys­
tems as they are used on flatlands, parallel terraces, ig^Lands, and land 
farmed on the contour. These data are derived in Table 20 in j^ppendix B. 
Permanent pasture 
Erosion rates and "production costs", i.e., lAe cost of renovating 
and maintaining grasslands, are computed in manner conpletely analogous 
to the tillage methods. The soil*loss estimates are quite simple since 
the C-factor is tabled (11$* Table 2, lines 120-122, p. lli). The computed 
values for all six capability classes are shown in Table 15 in Appendix A. 
!Oie annual renovation and maintenance costs are developed in Table 21 of 
Appendix B. 
^See (17, p. UO) 
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Terraced laad and contoured land 
]h estimating soil losses for the two tillage methods, the erosion:* 
control ivactice factor ("B-factor") in the soil-loss prediction equation 
was unily. Estimating losses on terraced land and contoured involves only 
insertion of the appropriate P-factor, (P < 1). The computed erosion rates 
for terraced land and land contour-cropped are in Tables 13 and Ik of 
Appendix A. The "production costs" of these practices have already been 
covered in the section on tillage methods costs. It was pointed out there 
that operating equipment on terraces will be assumed to be the same as for 
flatlands, -tMle contouring is equated with operating on slopes. 
The "laroduction cost" for the several alternative systems of tillage 
methods, erosion control practices and permanent pasture have aU been 
specified. However, derivation of production costs is only the first step 
in a series of calculations. The "cost" to be used in the program is the 
opportunity cost of not using the activity yielding the highest net returns 
on a given capability class. Thus we also need gross revenues from the 
row-crop rotation and from the pasture land (in terms of hay yields in the 
absence of an adequate measure of returns from grazing), as well as a 
charge to land and the costs of terracing. These values are given in 
Tables 22 and 23 of Appendix B. 
Gully control structures 
Both the sediment control and the cost concept of gully stabilization 
and control differ from those applied to tillage and land trelement 
practices. Ih dealing with gully control structures, the focus is on the 
amount of eroded soil held back from the watercourse rather than the 
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amount contrlbubed as vas the case with practices. Moreover, construction 
of structures to control gullying does not involve any opportuni^ cost 
Aram the fam operator's point of view. Therefore, the direct construction 
cost may be used in the "C-row" of the program. 
The erosion control (sediment retention) coefficient fox> a gully 
control structure and the maximum number of structures required for the 
basin are developed in Table 16 of Appendix A. The data used come from a 
sample of seven watersheds in the Nishnabotna Basin. The land area in­
cluded in the sample r^resents approodnately lit percent of the inventory 
acres. Annual cost of a structure is calculated in Table 2h of Appendix B. 
Only drop inlet structures are considered since this is the predominant 
type used in southwestern Iowa for control of severe erositm.^ V&thin 
each capability class, the program permits structures to be built vp to 
the limit of the amount of crop and pasture land in the erosion hazard 
subclass. 
All of the erosion rates calculated for the various land treatment 
practices implicitly assumed the absence of gullies. Since gully control 
structures retain eroded soil, the net sediment load contributed to the 
watercourse in the absence of control structures must be added to the sedi­
ment contributed hy the various practices. This "add-on" factor is in­
cluded in Table U lAich sunmarizes the physical and cost data for the 
several activities. 
^Burr, Edwin B., Geologist, Soil Conservation Service, U.S. D^t. of 
Agriculture, Des Moines, Iowa. Summary of watershed protection data in 
tie KLshnabotna Basin. jPrivate communication. April 16, 1970. 
Table U* Stmnaiy of cropland and control structure activities by land 
capability class 
C£Q>ap-
bility 
class System 
Gross 
revenue^ 
($/ac) ly Land charge® ($/ac) I
n 
I Coxrr. till. 111.28 28.22 32.75 
Coxnr. tin. + contour m.28 31.76 32.75 -
mn. till. 111.26 19.20 32.75 -
ttLn. till. + contour 111.28 21.28 32.75 _ . 
Pern. past. 86.I16 19.16 32.75 
II Com, till. 106.88 28.22 28.61 
Conv. till. + contour 106.88 31.76 28.61 » 
mn. till. 106.88 19.20 28.61 
ttin. till. + contour 106.88 21.28 28.61 
Terrace + conv, till. 106.88 28.22 28.61 7.1i6 
Terrace +' ndn. till. 106.88 19.20 28.61 7.16 
Perm. past. 80.31 19.16 28.61 
m Conv. till. 93.88 31.76 22.39 
MLn. till. 93.88 21.28 22.39 « 
Terrace + conv. till. 93.88 28.22 22.39 13.3U 
Terrace + min. till. 93.88 19.20 22.39 13.3b 
Perm. past. 72.10 19.16 22.39 
IV Conv. till. 70.48 31.76 16.37 
mn. till. 70.b8 21.28 16.37 
Terrace + conv. till. 70.18 28.22 16.37 lli.72 
Terrace + min. till. 70.18 19.20 16.37 lb.72 
Perm. past. 53.56 19.16 16.37 -
VI Perm. past. 1*1.20 15.16 9.10 -
vn Perm. past. 30.90 19.16 5.1*5 
i-vn QuUy control 
®I!poni Table 22. 
^Erom Tables 20, 21. 
°Ercm Table 23. 
%ince a 3 crop rotation is assumed, returns and erosion rates 
concerted to 3-acre equivalents. 
®Erom Tables 12-15. 
^Ercan Table 2U. 
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Net 
return 
($/ac) 
Net 
return 
($/3 ac) 
Cost 
($/3 ac) 
Erosion rate*^»® 
to%%/ac toq/3 ac 
Deliv­
ery 
ratio 
Soil 
delivered 
toq/3 ac 
50.31 150.93 27.06 5.1*68 16.1*05 25 li.lOl 
16.77 Ù0.31 37.68 3.281 9.81*3 2.1*61 
59.33 177.99 - 2.528 7.583 1.896 
57.25 171.75 6.21* 1.517 1*.550 1.138 
31.55 103.65 7l*.3l* 0.053 0.159 0.01*0 
50.05 150.15 27.06 1L.166 1*2.1*98 10.625 
16.51 139.53 37.68 7.083 21.250 5.313 
59.07 177.21 - 6.51*8 35.61*3 U.911 
56.99 170.97 6.21* 3.271* 9.822 2.1*56 
12.59 127.78 1*9.1*3 0.389 1.167 0.292 
51.61 351*.83 22.38 0.180 0.51*0 0.135 
32.57 97.71 79.50 0.138 0.1*31* 0.103 
39.73 319.19 31.1*1* 71.523 23l*.568 53.61*2 
50.21 150.63 33.060 99.181 2U.795 
29.93 89.79 60.8L 1.131 3.333 0.833 
38.95 116.85 33.78 0.513 1.51*0 0.385 
30.55 91.65 58.98 0.696 2.088 0.522 
22.35 67.05 31.1*1* 179.339 538.017 13U.501* 
32.83 98.1*9 — 82.896 21*8.688 62.172 
11.17 33.51 6U.98 2.626 7.878 1.970 
20.19 60.57 37.92 1.211* 3.61*2 0.911 
18.03 51t.09 i*l*.l*o 2.616 7.81*8 1.962 
12.91* 38.82 - 5.072 15.216 3.801* 
6.29 18.89 - 9.980 29.91*0 7=1*85 
3171.25^  
Net soil retention 
3.0529 9.1507 100 .0 9.1587 
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Table U (Continued) 
Equivalent Sediment 
Capa­ sediment Add*on for contribution 
bility concentration guUyingS (ffom 3 acres) 
class System 10"^  mg/l 10"^  mg/l 10-3 mg/l 
I Cow. till. 3.79226 0.6U780 1* .1*1*006 
Conv. till. + contour 2.27535 0.388U8 2.66383 
Mill. till. 1.75292 0.29928 2.05220 
Min. till. + contour 1.05180 0.17958 1.23138 
Pern. past. 0.03675 - 0.03675 
n Goxrr. till. 9.82U05 1.67733 11.50138 
Oonv. till. + contour U.91225 0.83870 5.75095 
Min. till. U.51i077 0.77527 5.31601* 
Min. till. + contour 2.27050 0.38765 2.65815 
Terrace + conv. till. 0.26976 - 0.26976 
Tferrace + min. till. 0.121*82 - 0.121*82 
Perm. past. 0.09570 0.09570 
m Cony. till. 1:9.60061 8.1*6868 58.06929 
mn. till. 22.92717 3.911*52 26.81(169 
Terrace + comr. till. 0.770U7 . - 0.7701*7 
Terrace + rain. till. 0.35599 0.35599 
Perm. past. 0.U8267 0.1*8267 
17 Cony. till. 12U.37069 21.231*73 11*5.6051*2 
ma, till. 57.18796 9.81531* 67.30330 
Terrace + cony. till. 1.82m - 1.82111 
Terrace + min. till. 0.81090 - 0.81*150 
Perm. past. 1.811)18 - 1.811*11* 
VI Perm. past. 3.5171*0 - 3.5171*0 
711 Perm. past. 6.92108 - 6.92108 
(per struct) 
^Permanent pasttire and terraced land are asstoned to make no contri­
bution to gully erosion. 
(^3.0529 net toiVstruct) (739 ac/struct)(.00092^ 66 ppq/ton) » 2.086119 
ppm/struct. 
7h 
Suspended sediment concentrations 
All of the erosion rates for the various activities have been calcur-
lated in terms of "tons per acre". In dealing with the watercourse it 
would be more convenient to eogxresB the suspended sediment load as a 
concentration, i.e., weight of suspended sediment per weight of a unit 
volume of water. An ecxpression for concentration, eoqwessed as parts per 
million (ppm) can be developed as follows: 
1 ac-ft • 1i3560 cu. ft. 
1 cu. ft. water @ 60®F » 62.37 lb. 
Thus, tons/ac-ft - " 13^8.1186 
ZUUv 
Since an expression in terms of ppm, i.e., ton per million tons, is 
desired. 
Therefore, 
Concentration, . " 9° , (6) (ppm) 
where Qs " amount of sediment in tons 
Qw " amount of water in acre-feet. 
Conversion from ppm to milligrams per Hter (mg/1) is easily made using 
the factors given in the U.S. Geological Survey report on the quality of 
Iowa streams (102, Table 1, p. 192). 
Long time averages for yearly mean flow, suspended sediment loads, 
and runoff, together with the calculated sediment concentrations are shown 
in Table 17 in Appendix A. A single calculation, using equation 6 and the 
average yearly runoff value from Table 17 of 796,125 ac-ft, shows that one 
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ton of eroded soil entering the watercourse contributes 92,hlS6 % 10"^ ppm 
to the suspended sediment load. 
Delivery ratio 
One of the most difficult values to determine is the delivery ratio, 
i.e., that percentage of the eroded soil that enters the watercourse. 
Given the complex nature of the problem and less than full understanding 
of the process, a rational means of arriving at a value is, for all practi­
cal purposes, inqaossible. A substantial amount of arbitrariness cannot be 
avoided. Zn an attempt to gain some insist into the order of magnitude 
of the value, the following procedure was followed. %e erosion rates 
developed for the stuc^r were allied to the actual land uses reported in 
the 1967 CNI data. The total annual sediment production for the basin was 
estimated to be W,700,000 tons. Suspended sediment loads, as given in 
Table 17, were calculated for several different time periods considered 
relevant to the stu^y. The delivery ratios determined Ia this way ranged 
from 20 percent to 29 percent, with the long time average (1^1:0-1963) 
value being 26.7 percent. For purposes of the study, a value of 25 per­
cent was chosen. 
Water quality standards 
Quantitative criteria standards for suspended sedijnent are hardly 
ever specified and values for turbidity are only slightly more plentiful.^ 
"Suspended sediment" and "turbidity" are not synonymous. Turbidity 
is a more inclusive term (59, p. 290). However, for the purpose of this 
study, criteria ^ cifled for turbidity will be taken as referring to a 
sin^e parameter, suspended sediment. 
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Another difficulty has to do with the imita in which turbidities are 
reported. The most commonly used expression of turbidity is the Jackson 
Tuitidity lM.t (JTU) lAdch is a measure of the extent to which the inten­
sity of light through water is diminished by the suspended and 
colloidal matter (59, p. 290). In other words, it is a measure of the 
optical properties of a water. This study wishes to deal with suspended 
sediment in terms of concentrations, dearly, there need be no coir», 
spondence between optical properties and concentration of suspended matter 
unless the particle size and shape of the suspended material is specified. 
Very litlJUe infonnation of this sort is available. However, one study (72) 
is available that reports concentration in mg/l versus JTU for %oming 
bentonite clay. Wyoming bentonite is essentially Hontmorillonite, ^ Aich 
in turn is the dominant clay mineral in Marshall soil.^ The relationship 
between concentration and turbidity for Mbntmorillonite over the range 
checked was linear, with lOOJTU « 150 mg/l (72, Figure 19, p. 75). This 
is the conversion factor that will be used in this study. 
The following quality standards are specified for use izi the analysis: 
1. Treatmmit of surface supplies with a "ground water" plant: Sus­
pended sediment 150 mg/l^ 
2. Warm water fish habitat: Suspended sediment 75 mg/l^ 
^Scott, A. D., Dept. of Agronomy, Iowa State Ifaiversity, Ames, Iowa. 
Information on the mineral conqposition of Marshall soils. Private com­
munication. June 5, 1970. 
^aumann, E. R., Dept. of Civil Engineering, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa. Possibilities of using less than full treatment on low-
turbidity surface water supplies. Private consiiunication. May 11, 1970. 
^Source; (98, p. 3h), 
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3. Aesthetics and primary contact recreation ("clear water"): Sus­
pended sediment 37.5 mgA»^ 
Summary of activities 
All of the coefficients derived in Appendices A and B for the activ­
ities described in the preceding pages are summarized in Table li. 
Prograirnidng Results 
The fact that such a wide range existed between the average sediment 
concentration of 10,600 mg/l and the more stringent use requirements 
suggested the possibility of running the program with parameteric changes 
in the quality constraints. With the highly efficient MPS linear program­
ming routine available for use on the IBÎ^360 Model 65 conçuter, programs 
of the size used required 8 to 10 seconds of CPU time and a maximum of 7 
minutes total time to generate solutions for the 15 parameter changes. 
The program was run to give solutions with the suspended sediment 
standards initially set at 10,600 mg/l, decreased (made more stringent) by 
1,000 mg/l increments down to 600 mg/l, and finally at 300, 150, 75, and 
37.5 mg/l levels. Obtaining solutions in this way made it possible to 
(1) develop total cost functions for the entire range of quality levels, 
(2) observe the various activities come in and go out of the optimal 
solutions, and (3) note the constancy of the "marginal cost", i.e., shadow 
price on the standards restraint, over different portions of the range of 
quality levels, 
^Source: (98, pp. 3-ii). 
^able 17; Appendix A. 
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In discussing the programming results some use will be made of the 
"names" assigned the various variables, e.g., TEEQOli, for "mininnan tillage 
on terraced land". The names and their meanings are listed in Table 5. 
Four runs were made on the conpiter. In the first, the activities 
were exactly as shown in Table U. For the second, aU of the activities 
involving minimum till%e, i.e., KQiTIL, CONT]Ii, TERMIN, were deleted but 
costs were not changed. Of interest here are the different activities 
entering the solution and the constancy of the value of the dual activity 
("marginal cost") for the quality standards row. In the third run, cost 
of the activities involving minimum till%e were set equal to the corre­
sponding conventional tillage activities, finally, the cost of those 
activities involving conventional tillage were assumed to equal the corr»* 
spending minimum tillage activities. Ih a sense, runs 1, 3, and U can be 
viewed as a sensitivity analysis of the ^ stem to cost changes while run 
number 2 reflects the effect of excluding a particular (modem) technology. 
Some general observations are possible about all of the compiter 
results. In every instance it was possible to achieve the most stringent 
quality standard of 37.5 mg/l. Land capability classes 1 and 2 were always 
used exclusively for row cropping without any terracing. Contouring never 
entered any of the c^tijnal solutions. The latter two observations are not 
particularly startling, as they r^resent to a large degree the prevailing 
attitudes of how one "should" farm. However, ^ en the three observations 
are taken together, it is somewhat surprising to find that not only could 
the most stringent standard be met but in fact it was possible to do so 
while maintaining a substantial part of the cropland in continuous row 
crops. 
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Table 5* Identification of variables used in the linear program 
Variable name Description 
CONTU 1 
CONPIL li 
IQMIL 1 
MDTTIL U 
CONTCON 1 
GONTGON 2 
cfxmm 1 
CONTMm 2 
TEROON 2 
TESCON U 
TESHIN 2 
TERMDf U 
mD 1 
MEAD 7 
GUm)N 2 
GDICOH 7 
KROP 2 
KROP 7 
UL 
Conventional tillage on capability classes 1 
•Uirough U 
MnLnum tillage on capablHlgr classes 1 through U 
Conventional tillage with contouring on capability 
classes 1 and 2 
Mnisnaa tillage with contouring on capability 
classes 1 and 2 
Conventional tillage with parallel level terraces 
on capabiliiy classes 2 through U 
ttinimoa tillage with parallel level terraces on 
capability classes 2 throu^ k 
Permanent pasture on capability classes 1 throu^ 7 
Gully control structures for capability classes 2E 
throu^ 7E 
Artificial activity for transferring land back and 
forth between cropland and gully control for 
capabi^ty classes 2 through 7 
Indicates that activity is at upper Unit at which 
it can enter 
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Computer runs 1 and U gave nearly identical results. The initial 
standard level of 10,600 mg/l could be achieved at zero cost, i.e., capa­
bility classes l-li all in MENTIL (or some CONTH in run h) and classes 6-7 
in MEAD, It was interesting to discover how closely the system of aU 
MINTIL and MEAD approached the long time average suspended sediment concen­
tration in the watercourse. It was purely by accident, i.e., the systen 
had not been designed wilJi this objective in mind, that the first solution 
in run 1 achieved a sediment concentration of 10,530.38 mg/l using only 
the zero cost activities. 
As the sediment standards become more stringent, the program pro­
ceeded to build gully control structures, terrace class 1| land up to the 
limit, and was terracing class 3 land when the 37.5 mg/L standard was 
achieved. The programming results for runs 1 and It are given in Table 6. 
Activities involving conventional tillage never enter any of the solutions 
in run 1 and only in one instance in run h. 
For run 2 in which all the minimum tillage activities are dieted, 
the land use pattern is altered substantially from that in runs 1 and li. 
All class U land was put into permanent pasture for the initial solution 
at the 10,600 mg/l level. To move down to the 2,600 mg/l level all class 
3 land was converted from CCWTIL to MEAD. Only then did gully control 
structures enter. The upper limit on structures was never reached. Ter­
racing activities never entered any of the solutions. The results of this 
run are summarized in Table 7. 
Run 3} in which activities involving minimum tillage were made as 
costly as those using conventional tillage, give results intermediate 
Xable 6. Idnear progranmijig results: first and fourth solutions 
Standard (fflgA) 
Value of 
objective 
function 
(total cost) 
(in million $) 
Value of dual 
acttvltgr for 
standard 
("marginal cost") 
($) 
Class 1 
10600® 
9600 0.522 0.56lli5 
8600 1.081 0.563li5 
7600 1.6U5 0.561L5 
6600 2.299 0.71501 
5600 3.011t 0.71501 
1*600 3.833 1.29168 
3600 5.128 I.29I168 
2600 6.1t22 1.29168 
1600 7.717 1.29U68 
600 9.012 1.291^68 
300 9.U01 1.291*68 
150 9.595 1.291*68 
75 9.692 1.291*68 
37.5 9.7W 1.291*68 
KDÎTH.-UL'' 
-TIL 
run 1 the actual standard achieved was 10530.U mg/l. 
run U 11% of class 1 land was in OONTIL and 23% in HINTIL at the 
10)600 mg/l level. 
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Activities in optimal solutions 
Class 2 Class 3 Class U Classes 6,7 
HINTIL-UL 
GULCOK-UL 
-UL 
MUrriL-ÏÏL 
(SJIfiOS 
-UL 
TERKQî 
V \l/ 
MIIilTnr>DL 
GDICON 
-TIL TERMZf 
Nk -UL ^-UL 
-UL 
MEAD-UL 
GULCQN-UL 
\ ^ —U%^ ^ —UL 
Table 7. Lltiear programming résulta: second solution 
Value of 
objective 
Standard . function 
(n^A) ("total cost") 
(in million $) 
Value of dual 
activity fw 
standard 
("marginal cost") Class 1 ($) 
10600 20.892 0.1(7821 
9600 21.370 0.17821 
8600 21.819 0.1»782L 
7600 22.327 0.1*7821 
6600 22.805 0.1*7821* 
$600 23.283 0.1*7821* 
iiéOO 23.762 0.1*7821* 
3600 2U.2U0 0.1*7821* 
2600 2U.728 0.5611*5 
1600 25.290 0.5611*5 
600 25.851 0.56lli5 
300 26.020 0.5611*5 
150 26.101* 0.5611*5 
75 26.IU6 0.5611*5 
37.5 26.167 0.5611*5 
OONTIL-UL 
\j/ -UL 
^Alternative vectors for the GDLCON activity could have been 
classes 3, h, 6, 7. 
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Activities in optimal solutions 
Class 2 Class 3 Class U Glass 6,7 
CONTIL-UL CONTH. MEAD 
GRJLCON 
V -UL V 
mD-QL 
-UL 
GULCON 
.UL 
V-UL \kUL 
MEAD-UL 
\kUL NU-UL 
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between run 2 and run U» both in terns of cost and land use. land in 
class li was all in permanent pasture ty the time the 7,600 tag/l standard 
-was reached. Gully control structures entered at the 7,600 ittg/l lev^ and 
all were constructed by the tine the UjôOO ing/l level was reached. Perma^ 
nent pasture entered on class 3 land at the Uj600 rag/l level and became 
the dominant land use on that class (with a corresponding decline in 
lOlfFlL} Iqr the time the 31,$ mg/L standard was achieved. Terracing activi­
ties never entered any of the solutions. The values for the various 
solutions and the changes in activities £or this run are summarized in 
Table 8. 
The differences in land use found between runs 3 and U give an indi­
cation of the cost-sensitivilgr of specifying an efficient set of control 
methods for achieving specified standards. Run 1 versus run U points 
clearly the dominance of the minimum tillage activities. This dominance 
is reinforced by cong)aring runs 1 and 2. In the latter all class 3 and U 
land (nearly 900,000 acres or more than $0 percent of the cropland in the 
study) is taken out of row crops. Discussion of any normative implications 
of these changes is deferred until Chapter V. 
Table 8. Id near programning results: third solution 
Value of Value of dual 
objective activity for 
Standard function standard 
(ng/l) ("total cost") ("^margimal cost") Class 1 
(in mUUon $) ($) 
10600 
9600 
8600 
7600 
6600 
5600 
1*600 
3600 
2600 
1600 
600 
300 
150 
75 
37.5 
17.339 
17.323 
17.521 
17.917 
18.1:78 
35.0I;0 
15.705 
20.750 
21.795 
22.810 
23.885 
21.198 
2U.355 
2U.li33 
21.172 
0.15790 
0.15790 
0.5611:5 
0.5611:5 
0.5611:5 
1.0W:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
1.010:82 
HnnTiL^ooKrn. 
-TJL 
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Activities in optimal solutions 
Class 2 Class 3 Class U Class 5 
MINTIWJL 
GQLCCN 
• •UL 
V-ULV-OL 
MINIIL-DL 
GOICQN 
-UL 
MEAD 
V V-IJLV 
MmTHfUL 
[he^B 
—UIi 
onLCQN-in. 
V-ÎILW-UL 
MEAD-UL 
OUICOH-Ul 
v-W-UL 
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CHAPTER V. mSTlTDTIONAl ACTERMATIVES 
The progrsimning results detailed in the previous chapted* are com­
pletely silent on how the costs are to be distributed. Whil e it is truie 
that the costs developed for the various land treatment practices were 
calculated as opportunity costs, that ISj the cost to the operator of 
using a practice that yielded less than the highest possible alternative 
net return, no assertion was made as to who should bear the increased cost. 
3h this chapter various cost-distribution schesnes will be examined 
and evaluated in teims of the institutional "criteria" specified in Chap­
ter n. A policy model for controlling pollution from sediment is 
presented and discussed. 
Defining the Groins 
(Even the premise of the study that water quality is a collective 
good and, hence, the market mechanism is not capable of expressing societal 
preferences, noivmarket arrangements for achieving the desired ends must be 
devised. The principal non-market means under a democratic system of 
government for attaining such ends is the political (voting) process. 
However, irrespective of the process used, the fulfillment of collective 
wants requires specification of the groups involved. For the situation 
under study, two grotps are involved that can be identified rather pre­
cisely. On the one hand there a:"e the "water polluters", i.e., the farm 
operators. Their number can be estimated to be 3,61*^.^ The o-tihier clearly 
^Nunber of farm operators • 1,61*0,099 acres cropland/li50 acres per 
farm. 
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Identifiable group includes all the "water users". While the two groves 
need not be mutualUy exclusive, it shall be assumed that they are and 
designate the inhabitants of the city at the lower end of the basin as 
the "users". Thus, there are 10,000 individuals in this category. If one 
assumes that each groiq> is made of family units of three members, two 
of whom are adults, then there will be 7,290 potential voters among the 
"polluters" and 6,66? voters in the "users" groigi* Ih other words, each 
group possesses approximately equal political strength, with a slight 
majority in favor of the "polluters". 
The Nature of Institutions for Providing Public Goods 
In the discussion of the economic dimension of the problem in Chapter 
II, it was seen frcan Sanoelson's work that injection of any substantial 
degree of "publicness" into a market system destroys the system's ability 
to achieve Pareto-optimality. For the larg&-number, public good case one 
must, of necessity, operate in a "world of second bests" (12, p. 186). 
What can the economist say in such a situation? Arthur Maass, as quoted 
by Chase (15, pp. 30-31), offers an interesting perfective of "lAat 
économiste ought to do": 
I am concomed over the siqjposed necessity for economists to deter­
mine and reconcile the preferences of individuals when the necessary 
information cannot be obtained from the market .... The difficulty 
with ... ascertaining individuals* preferences for public programs 
is ths* it denies or ignores the function of government .... If 
the economist is to act as an adviser to government in determining 
standards and criteria for designing a public program, then it seems 
to me that he should not fe^ that it is incumbent on him to discover 
or reconmend a sin^e standard, or single citizens' preference func­
tion. What he ought to do, rather, is prepare data that show the 
consequences of several possible standards or preference functions or 
trade-offs, and then leave it to the institutions of representative 
government to choose one of thase. 
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He then notes "we can iise political institutions to reveal values for 
nonefficiency benefits as we use the market institution for efficiency 
ones" (IS, p. 32). Herein lies a possible solution to the economist's 
dilemma. VBrile this study is not concerned with estimation of "Maass-
type" benefitsj it is possible to follow Maass* lead and investigate the 
consequences of alternative standards under different political-adminis­
trative arrangements. First, however, it is necessary to review some of 
the conteng)orary thinking regarding the theory and implementation of 
institutiozK. 
Buchanan (12, pp. 1$1-169) has discussed the theory of institutions 
for providing public goods. His major points may be summarized as follows. 
Rules of choice or institutions are needed to "make choices in advance" 
lAen it is evidraat that similar choice situations will reoccur and the 
cost of decisioiHmakixig is high, i.e., idien it is necessary for separate 
individuals to reach agreement. TiEth such rules the cost of decision 
making can be reduced substantially, although at the cost of some currents-
period inefficiencies. If one defines the term "constitution" to refer to 
"rules and institutions that continue in being from period to period, 
iadependently of choices made within periods" (12, p. 160), two "consti­
tutions" for reaching groiq) decisions may be identified, first, there are 
the rules that define the manner of arriviJig at grotqp or collective out­
comes. These make up idiat is termed the "political constitution". An 
efficiency criterion for political constitutions is the VUcksellian 
"effective unanimity" rule, the institutional counterpart of the Pareto 
criterion (12, pp. 155-156). IfaaairaLty rules are overly restrictive and. 
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departures from them, such as sin^e majority Dotimgj can be justified on 
efficiency grounds if st^iplemental rules for reaching groiq> choices are 
devised. Such additional rules involve specif^ying a fiscal constitution, 
i.e., institutions or rules for making fiscal decisions. These rules are 
a desirable adjunct to majority rule, first, since by limiting the possi­
ble outcomes under majority rule, they reduce decision making costs. 
Second, and perhaps more important, majority rules reduce costs of decision 
making relative to a unanimity rule but greatly increase inr-period inef-
ficiences. By restricting majority rules with supplemental fiscal rules, 
some of the efficiency characteristics of unanimity rules are regained 
without paying the hi^r decisioivmaking costs inherent in more restric­
tive political rules. Thus, political decision rules and fiscal rules can 
be viewed as substitutes (12, pp. 158-159)* 
]h theory one would esqpect that for greatest efficiency the two public 
decision variables, i.e., the tax and the expenditure mix, would be con­
sidered simultaneously. In reality this practice is seldom, if ever, 
followed. However, efficiencies are possible if the cozmmily sees that 
fiscal decisions must be made every year and agrees to impose iqxm them^ 
selves, via their legislature, a fiscal constitution that preselects a set 
of tax-sharing arrangements. Such a system has hl^ in-period inefi^cien-
cies, but from a longer range point of view, it avoids having to deal with 
the lAole matter of cost-distribution of publlcally provided goods and 
services every year. It also reduces the possiblllly of exploitation of 
/ 
minorities by majority coalitions. "Potential exploitation costs as well 
as declslozHmaking costs may be reduced by specific tax-sharing rules that 
take on constitutional characteristics" (12, p. 160). 
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The final point concerns the conditions under lAich it would be 
relatively efficient to specify a fiscal constitution. The answer ixcTolves 
the nature of the collectively provided goods and services. As a guiding 
hypothesis, general rules for tax-sharing are more acceptable to the 
individual members of the communily idien the publicly siqapUed goods and 
services provide general rathw than special benefits. Under the operation 
of majority rule special-benefit goods Kill be over supplied under a 
general taxation scheme. Therefore, for such cases, any tax^sharing rules 
laid down in advance should provide for special rather than general taxes 
(12, pp. 162-163). 
So much for theoretical considerations. The Coamittee on Pollution 
of the National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council (65, Appexv-
dix 6, pp. 203-221) has taken an incisive look at the two major '^models'* 
used for decision making in the pollution control area. Speaking of the 
two models, the Committee states: 
One has stressed technological rationality in resources management 
and optimizing methods in systems design and public investment. A 
second puts a like emphasis iq)on legal ri^ts and interests and iqpon 
legal and administrative adjudication, rule-making or standards. 
The first is especially compatible with a basin or watershed regional 
model of organization; the latter with a formal administrative and 
political hierarchy of the federal government, the states, and the 
localities. Among the professions, engineers and economists are 
inclined to favor the first; lawyers and administrators the second 
(65, p. 20U). 
The Committee goes on, in some detail, to examine the strengths, weak­
nesses and compatibility of the two systems The two principal conclu­
sions reached by the Committee are: 
^•The Committee's argument will not be r^eated here. However, their 
entire discussion is recommended to anyone having a serious interest in 
the practicalities of legal and public administration a^cts of pollution 
control. 
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1. That there is no one calculus or organizational model, acceptable 
as both rational and jixst, for deciding or iirplenenting decisions 
about the burdens and the benefits of pollution control. 
2. That the most important needs, therefore, in the effort of 
institutional design, are clearer understanding both of the value 
and limitations of any o^ method or orgaidzation for decision­
making, and of ways by lÀich to contine methods and organizations 
so as to mediate the tension between technical and economic ratio%&-
ality and legal and political conceptions of justice and self-
deteratLnation (65, p. 205). 
The thrust of the entire discussion by both Buchanan and the Cononittee 
on Pollution is that condbinations of institutions are available and, 
indeed, needed for the provision of collective ^ ods in a manner that 
achieves some degree of administrative efficiency, equity, and political 
acceptance* The essence of the nature of institutions for providing 
public goods is captured In the pot^Kwrri of fiscal rules, administrative 
structures, regional plans, and economic incentives and sanctions avails 
able for use. 
Alternative Cosl^-sharing Arrangements 
Ih this section three distinct i^stems for sharing the costs of 
achieving various levels of suspended sediment in the wateoraourse are 
described and evaluated. 
The cost data used are those îrcan the first computer run as given in 
Table 6 plus the costs associated vith alternative municipal water stçply 
systems. Data for the latter are shown in Table 9. Dominance of the 
ground water alternative idien the inr-stream sediment load is greater than 
150 ng/1 is clearly evident from this table. 
The three cases to be examined involve, first, the situation when the 
polluter "pays"; second, that lAere the user bears the costs; and, finally. 
Table P. Costs of alternative municipal water mqiply systems^ 
Gong)onent 
Surface, 
mshnabotna 
( > 150 rag/l sediment) 
($Ar) 
Surface, 
KLshnàbotna 
( $ 150 mg/l sediment) 
($/yr) 
3|i 
Surface, 
more distant 
150 n^/L sediment 
($/jr) 
Transmission 2,8hl 2,81jl 10,258 32,108 
Punç>age (1736 gpn) U,33ii h,32h 5,153 7,070 
Wells (li) 1,2m 
Piaqas (h) 1,12*2 
Treatment^: 
Surface stgipay 
Qround stqiply 
76,072 
32,060 32,060 32,060 
Totals 83,227 39,215 h9,827 71,238 
®Fr<Mn Table 25, Appendix B. 
^^^Flxed and variable costs. 
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the situation lAere the costs are shared by all of the "involved" members 
of society. 
The polluter pays 
Welfare sconoaiiic theory has held that technf^gical external diseco­
nomies can be counteracted by taxing the polluter and/or subsidizing the 
damaged party (52, pp. 9^99) * However, as Turvey (93) has shown, the 
traditional "tax^bounty" solution, for all practical purposes, has been 
destroyed. For the case under consideration, it should be recalled that 
vhile water pollution was characterized in Chiçter II as an externalities 
problem, -water quality enhancement was declared to be a collective good. 
Taxing schemes and user charges do have a place in coping with goods 
characterized by a substantial degree of publicness and a large number of 
users (12, pp. 182-186). 
The polluter has absolutely no incentive to voluntarily comply with 
any standard since all of the benefits accrue else&Aere. The cost of 
achieving the most stringent standard is million dollars, as shown 
in Table 6. The same table indicates that the pollution abatement was 
achieved throu^ the use of minimum tillage, and the construction of 
terraces and gul3y control structures. Thus, essentially all of the costs 
are construction costs, as opposed to the cost of using a practice yielding 
a lower net return. This result arises ft-om the fact that minimum tillage 
not on3y yidds a hi^ net return but also is quite efficient as an erosion 
control measure. Table U indicates that, because of the lower production 
costs on terraced land, the farm operator could absorb $1.88 of the per 
acre terrace cost, i.e., approximately lU percent of the cost on class 3 
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land and approximately 13 percent on class k» and not be made any worse 
off îlnallyj Table 9 shows that the municipality coxild shift from a 
ground water to a surface water supply at an annual saving of $10,612. 
The frequently made assertion that the polluter should bear all the 
costs of his operations. Including any externally imposed costfe, has the 
appearance of being nothing more than a value judgiement based on equity 
considerations. Actually, if there are cœiçeting iises for the (polluted) 
watercourse and the polluter is not "charged" for using it, he has access 
to an economic resource at less than its opportunity cost (60, p. 5). It 
also is recognized that the increased costs to a firm of pollution abat^ 
ment will be "passed along" to its consumers in the form of hi^r prices 
(92, p. 673). However, for the agricultural entrepreneur this option is 
not available, since he tends to be a "pric&-taker", operating as he does 
in the most nearly perfectly conçietitive of real-world markets. 
The cost per operating unit of achieving the most stringent quality 
standard is $2,672 per year,^ Clearly, if confronted with this one issue, 
i.e., there are no opportunities for "logrolling", the polluters will 
reject strict quality standards, assuming that the issue is put directly 
to the people, say in a. referendum. In order to have strict standards and 
taxation of the polluters, the standards must be imposed by a hi^r level 
^t is interesting to note that in the Pine Lake watershed near 
Eldora, Iowa, one of the few watersheds to have received essentially total 
ïÇ)land treatment, approximately 85 percent of the costs were borne by the 
non-farm sector, Laflen, John, A»R.S.-U.S,D,A., Ames, Iowa. Land treat­
ment program in the Pine Lake watershed. Private ccmnunication. 1970. 
^$9,7ii0,000/361;5 operators • $2,672 per operator. 
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of authority. It is here that the state^ as holder of "residual sover­
eignty"^, has a role to play both in setting standards and in creating 
taxing authorities. 
How does such a system fare when evaluated against the institutional 
"criteria" dev&Lpped in Chapter U? 
The first criterion requires that major atgp]y and use areas be 
included in the management entity. The "polluters on3y" system fails on 
this count. The second criterion, having to do with size of financial 
base, is not violated. Criterion three suggests that a wide range of 
quality is^rovement techniques be available to the management unit. To 
the extent that a number of different activities came into the optimal 
solutions of the various conpiter runs, this requirement was met. However, 
aU alternatives were restricted to control at the pollution source. The 
fourth criterion was met in that water quality was very much related to 
the use of the associated land areas and all water quantity requirements 
were fulfilled. The final criterion was not met since the preferences of 
all the parties involved were not determined and taken into account in the 
management decision. This is especially true of "Wie parties most directly 
affected, the polluters. 
In summary, it may be concluded that failure to meet the first and 
last "criteria" casts serious doubt on the efficacy of placing the entire 
cost burden upon the polluter. This conclusion is reached totally apart 
from the impact that the additional cost burden mi^ have upon a marginal 
operator. 
^or a discussion of the role of the state, see (65, pp. 212-218). 
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The user pays 
]h the case vdiere the users must pay, thé standards woiildj of neces­
sity, have to be imposed extemaJQy, since less costly alternatives for 
municipal -water siqqpDy, and recreation (swimndng, fishing) are available. 
Only aesthetics remain of concern to the xusers. J£ the users had the 
option of selecting a standard in the range 1^0 mg/l to 35*7 mg/1, some 
interesting possibilities arise. Undoubtedly there would be near una^ 
nimity for the l50 mg/l level since (1) it is the least costly of the 
alternatives, (2) it peonndLts additional econand.es in the municipal water 
supply System, and hence (3) its benefits are quite widespread. For the 
remaining uses (and corresponding standards), subgroups of users Kill 
emerge, unless the extreme assusqption of identical preference functions 
is made. The selection of the exact standard desired by the community 
comes about through bargaining, compromise, voting, or other nonmarket 
xaeans of groip decision-maldmg. Once the standard is selected, the costs 
involved can be borne either throu^ user charges (special taxes) and/or 
general taxes. Given the nature of the uses, one would e^gect a combina» 
tion of the two taxation schemes to emerge. The exact mix will be decided 
within the community. 
The same conclusion follows if the exact standard is set exogenously. 
The effort (cost) of deciding iqx)n the standard will be saved. By the 
same token, there is no way of assuming that the standard is, in any sense, 
optimal from the conmunity's point of view. 
When evaluated in terms of the institutional criteria, the present 
system exhibits even more deficiencies than found in the system tdiere the 
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polluter paid. There is no lorLty of and use areas and, thus, all 
of the relevant parties are not represented in the decision making process. 
Size of the management entity and the resulting financial base do not pose 
any problem. Since control of sediment for instream uses is oonfii^ to 
the source areas, the administrative structure required for the use area 
to extend its influence over the upper reaches of the basin would be quite 
complex. Therefore, it would be difficult to meet criteria 3 and U which 
call for consideration of a wide range of water quality in^rovement tech­
niques, and managing water quantity, qualllgr and land use jointly. 
Costs shared by all parties 
(hven the less than satisfactory arrangements possible under the two 
cases just reviewed, lAat are the possibilities for meeting the Institua 
tional goals idien all of the involved parties are Included? VELthin the 
context of the study, "involved parties" are restricted to the polluters 
and the users. It should be recognized that in a more realistic setting 
persons other than these two groups, including persons from outside the 
basin, undoubtedly would be involved. However, for sixQ)licity, this 
analysis shall focus on]y on the two grotps. 
To reiterate a caveat made earlier, any political-administrative 
structure devised for managing water quality undoubtedly will be ineffi­
cient in the economist's sense of the term. Economic optimizing requires 
rather precise knowledge of individuals' marginal evaluations of collective 
goods ("benefit functions") and the marginal cost of collective "bads" 
("damage functions"). One groiç of experts, chaired, interestingly, by 
JLUen Kheese, concludes that such techniques are "utpplan, or, at best, a 
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prospect for the distant future" (65, p. 212). Moreover, Meyer (60, pp. 
11-13) points out that mere "Internalization" will not do away with the 
public goods "problem". In fact, we cannot even prove that it is a 
sufficient condition for inprovement. 
Keeping in mind the "second-best" nature of the effort, consider the 
following system. A basin-wide management authority, a governmental entity 
created by the state legislature, is the basic management unit. VMle the 
authority is a separate entity, the State retains, throu^ its "Department 
of Natural Resources", certain powers that assure consistency among author­
ities. Further, coordination of activities taking lOace within the state, 
with other states, and with the Federal government are reserved for the 
State's resources department. Finally, the resources department develops 
water quality criteria and provides technical assistance to the authority 
in establishing water quality standards. 
The authorily would be vested with the police, tax, and eminent do­
main powers. Thus, it could set standards, make expenditures for treat­
ment facilities, require the use of certain engineering structures and 
land treatment practices, and raise the revenues needed for its operations. 
As a practical matter, the policy making grotç» of the authority would be 
appointed by the state with the day-to-day operation left to hired pro­
fessional administrative and technical personnel. 
Subordinate to and creatures of the authority would be a group of 
subareas, based on watershed, tributory or municipality boundaries, that 
embrace the entire basin. The responsibilities of these subsidiary groins 
would be double-edged. On the one hand they would have the re^onsibility 
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of carrying the local views to the authority. On the other, they carry 
performance standards and the area*s share of the total abatenent cost 
from the authority back to the area. There th^y would have the re^onsi-
bility of distributing the costs among the residents of the area. Because 
of the nature of the responsibilities of the sui>>groups, the members 
probably should be elected by popular vote in their area. 
Quality criteria, as devised by the authority staff with technical 
assistance from the state, would be viewed as ideal or ultimate goals. 
Standards, with the associated costs (of the sort derived in Chapter IV of 
this study) would be specified by the authoriiqr after consideration of the 
demands (uses) for the watercourse, alternatives not involving the water­
course for meeting the demands, and the preferences of the populace of 
the subareas. Regarding the last point, an informed electorate can act 
rationally. Kneese and Bower (52, pp. 231^233) describe an interesting 
case involving the Delaware estuary. live "objective sets", i.e., sets of 
standards, were developed, with number one being the most stringent and 
number Hve representing maintenance of the existing conditions. Rou^ 
benefit and cost estimates ware made for Sets 1 through li. Set 3 appeared 
to be marginal, i.e., moving to Set 1 or 2 appeared to be uneconomic. An 
advisory committee involving the general public, industry, local govern­
ment, planning agencies, and conservation interests recoranended Set 3. In 
public hearings essentially all the debate centered around Sets 2 and 3. 
Nearly everyone recognized tha,t the other objective sets were not in the 
"public interest". Siibsequently the Delaware River Basin Gammission, in 
good political fashion, adopted an objective set falling between 2 and 31 
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Once the standard is fixed, i.e., the quantity of pubUc good to be 
svçjplied is determined, the cost of providing the good is specified 
simultaneousQy (assuming availability of least-cost studies of the sort 
reported dzi Chapter IV). There remains only the matter of allocating the 
cost among the basin's citizens. As Indicated earlier, this task would be 
performed by the local grotps. The authority could aid them, in the case 
of diffuse pollutants, by establishing a set of fiscal rules that related 
tax rates to land capability class and required land use and practices. 
Deviations from the norms vould result in a tax credit or a surtax. 
Alternatively, the authority could zone land capability classes for par­
ticular uses, e.g., row crops, row crops only with terraces, pasture and 
woodlands only. A simpler taxing scheme, based on productivity and, hence, 
land value, for the permitted uses, would be possible. In either case, 
the onus of levying taxes is taken off the local group. As far as the 
financing function is concerned, their main role is policing land uses and 
collecting taxes. 
Because dollar requirements may vary Aram year to year, the fiscal 
rules could be stated in "tax factors", i.e., an index number. When the 
dollar needs become known, it would be a simple matter to assign a dollar 
value to the factors. 
User charges could play a role in raising the needed revenues. They 
would be especially appropriate for uses such as municipal water supply 
and recreation. 
The general administrative costs of the authority could be met by a 
general tax, based either on income or wealth, imposed on all basin resi-
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dents. Finally, it should be remembered that funds front higher levels of 
government imdoubtedHy win be available to the authority for pollution 
control and conservation practices. To the extent that they are, they 
will reduce the dollar levys on the basin polluters and users. 
We turn now to evaluating the proposed gystem in terms of the insti­
tutional criteria suggested in Chapter II, 
1. The water management entity should encompass the major supply and 
use areas, and thus account for the major interactions. 
By defining the management authoriiy so as to take in the entire basin, 
the first criterion is fulfilled. 
2. The water management entity should be of sufficient size to 
(a) provide an adequate financial base, ssad (b) take advantage of 
amy scale economies in waste treatment or water supply systems. 
Again, the basin^wide authority, covering an area of several thousand 
square miles and with broad tax powers, meets the criterion. 
3. The water management agency should have a wide range of water 
quality improvement techniques available to it. 
h* Water quality should be managed jointly with water quantity and 
the relevant associated land areas. 
The suggested authority meets these criteria through its ability to con­
sider a variety of land treatment practices, control structures, and water 
supply alternatives, as well as its power to control land use. Water 
quantity control is easily included having the state water allocation 
latf administered by the state resources department, with the authority 
acting as its agent in the basin. 
5. Values representing the preferences of supply areas, use areas, 
and political entities should be determined and expressed in water 
management decisions. 
lOU 
This criterion is provided for by the inclusion of popularly elected 
groiqps to r^esent the sub-areas of the basin. 
A Policy Control Model for Sediment 
Examination of the case where all the relevant parties are involved, 
i.e., a regional system, suggests a conceptual model for sediment control. 
This model, as illustrated in figure 6, would be useful in developing an 
integrated and coordinated program for erosion control. 
The model contains four strata and five points. Point "A" reflects 
societal goals, expressed in terms of quality criteria, as sought through 
the higher levels of representative government. Point *'E*' is the current 
level of pollution in the absence of any control efforts. 
Point "D" represents the highest level of erosion control that a firm 
(fana operator) can be expected to attain under the assumption of economic 
rationality. 
Point "C" gives the level that a small group may be expected to 
achieve voluntarily in the absence of any form of coercion or incentive 
from a hi^r level of authority. This level can be expected to vary 
widely, according to the ^ clal interests of the particular grotp. 
Point "B" reflects the highest level attainable under a system that 
balances criteria imposed from above with interest-group pressures and with 
democratic processes. 
All of the points probably will be suboptimal in terms of economic 
efficiency criteria, i.e., equating marginal costs with marginal benefits. 
However, an efficient set of practices, in a cost-miniMzing sense, for 
achieving any of the levels can be developed. 
OBSTACLES KEÎEDIES 
Disparity of uses among 
basins; subqptimality of 
criteria 
No incentive for voluntary ® 
action 
Lack of incentive or 
ability to organize 
voluntari3y 
Lack of information about 
efficient soil erosion 
practices 
E 
PtmT.Tn rSTATF. OR AL) QCAIg 
RESPCKS3BILrrY OF PUBLIC 
BASIN (lARGE (ROUP) LEVEL 
PvESPCWSIBnJTY OF BASIN 
DISTRICT (SMALL GROUP) LEVEL 
RESPŒBIBIIJTT OF DISTRICT 
LfiViyJi 
RESPONSIBILTrr OF ÎIRM 
EXISTING I£VEL 
B 
Development of criteria; 
coordination among basins; 
assist basins in estab­
lishing standards 
Establishment of standards 
by basin having tax, bonding 
and police powers 
Enforce standards set by 
basin; bring local voice 
to basin 
Education 
E 
Figure 6, A sediment pollution control model (adapted from 2a, Figure 9, p. 17) 
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The points also delimit strata or "zones of responsibility" associ­
ated vith the various groups and subgroiçs (2a, p. 18). The zone from 
"E" to "D" represents the movement toward the water quality criteria that 
can be achieved by economically rational individual firms (farm operators) 
operating with full information regarding the efficiency and profitability 
of various practices,^ 
In the usual case of the provision of a public good, the zone from 
"0" to "C" would represent the additional improvement in quality beyond 
that which is rational for an individual to provide, but which a group of 
individuals ndgiht band together to provide collectively. For the small 
groïÇ) case the good may be provided voluntarily (68, pp. 33-36). However, 
in the case of water pollution, i.e., the case of a collective "bad", the 
polluters would not voluntarily provide pollution control and the users, 
even if organized, would be powerless to impose control upon the polluters. 
The "D" to "C" zone will exist only if coercion or incentives are imposed 
by a higher authority. 
A zone "C" to "B" will not arise voluntarily (68, pp. hh-hS)* The 
increase in pollution abatement in this strata reflects the higher stand­
ards that result from the criteria established at the State level, counter­
vailing any special interest groups that may exist at the district level. 
It is to this level of organization that the tax, bonding, and police 
powers are given. 
"^"The assumption of large, homogeneous operating units assumes away 
many of the obstacles cited by Timmons as inçeding the adoption of conser­
vation practices by individual operators. Relaxing the assumption of 
homogeneous units would require consideration of these obstacles. See 
(2a, pp. 11-16) and the references cited there. 
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The existence of a "B" to "A" zone arises from two conditions. First, 
there is the recognition that the level of water quality need not be imi-
form across all basins. This conclusion arises from the definition of 
water quality as a use-related concept. Uses would not be expected to be 
identical in all basins. Second, criteria and standards are imprecise 
substitutes for marginal evaluation of benefits and costs. In general, 
the quantity of a public good supplied, i.e., the "amount" of pollution 
abatement, is suboptimal. Therefore, level "A" need not be "correct". If 
more precise evaluation techniques become available in Uie future, the 
standards set for level "B" would be optimal and the gap between "A" and 
"B" would be closed. Of course, the coordinating and basin differentiating 
functions of the State would remain, but the movement from quality level 
"E" to level "A" would be achieved. 
Within each strata three major activities can be identified, first, 
the obstacles to achieving levels "D", "C", 'T3", and "A" have to be 
identified. Then it is necessary to devise means for overcoming the 
obstacles. Finally, the means devised must be implemented (2a, p. 16). 
This entire process is indicated in figure 6. As indicated there and in 
the discussion of the regional organization, a combined approach using 
taxation and subsidies, land use control through zoning, stream standards, 
and education is enqployed. 
In summary, we find that the institutional arrangements for providing 
public goods becomes an exercise in applied political economy. The econo­
mist's major role is seen as providing the decision maker with the costs 
I 
in^licit in alternative standards. In addition, he can make explicit the 
tax burdens under different structural arrangements. 
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Three systems for controlling sediment in a river basin were examined. 
Two were found inadequate in terms of previously developed criteria. The 
third, involving a regional scheme that follows hydrologie boundaries and 
sweeps in supply areas, use areas, and ind^endent governmental entities, 
met the suggested criteria. 
Prom the discussion of the regional system a pollution control model 
was developed in a manner that accommodates the results of the analysis. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCnJSIOHS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUMMARY 
The point has now been reached where it is possible to assess the 
study's achievements) limitations, and inplications. Having done this, it 
will then be possible to suggest areas in which additional stu^y is needed. 
Conclusions Related to the Study Objectives 
The first objective of the study sought means of bringing together 
quality-differentiated demands and water sillies of differing qualities. 
Central to the attainment of this objective was specification of a hydro-
logic framework that linked sources, transmission system, and uses that 
differ both as to quality and quantity. Such a system was modeled in 
Chapter HI. While conceptually complete, the system suffers from a lack 
of reality brought about by the rather severe sinplifying assumptions 
introduced in Chuter IV. Notwithstanding these limitations, the system 
does indicate the type and form of physical data required. Further, an 
extensive set of techniques for enhancing the quality of the siq^ly were 
introduced. The system shows how demands and siqjplies, mismatched in terms 
of quality, can be brought into balance. Since the system is entirely 
physical, the question of itfliich quality-improving techniques should be 
employed, or, indeed, should any of them be used could not be answered at 
this point. 
It is concluded that, in terms of a broad analytic approach, the 
objective has been achieved quite well. 3h terms of hydrologie niceties, 
it scores less well. However, this latter point is felt to be primarily 
a reflection of the degree of understanding that currently exists of the 
relevant physical relationships plus a lack of data. 
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The second objective caned for calculating the least-cost means for 
balancing supplies with demands through manipulation of the quality of the 
supply. The results of these calculations -were reported in Tables 6, 1, 
and 8 in Chapter 17. Recan i'Jiat in computer solutions 1 and U an 
activities were priced relative to minimum tillage in the former, and, in 
the latter, minimm and conventional tillage were priced equally. The 
results of the two runs were identical with minimum tillage ccmplet^y 
dominating the other tillage method. Since minimum tillage carried a zero 
opportunity cost, an of the costs in these solutions were construction 
costs for terraces and gully control structures. As noted in the preceding 
chapter, the farm operator, under the assumptions made, cou].d pay approxi­
mately 15 percent of the terrace costs and not be made worse off. 
It is interesting to contrast the results idien minimum tillage was in 
the program (Table 6) and run 2 in which it was removed (Table 7). In each 
instance the most stringent quality standard could be achieved, but the 
land use patterns were quite different. Run 2 represaits the case in 
vlaich the farm operator ignores, i.e., is ignorant of or refuses to adopt, 
the 'Hiest" technology. In this solution an of the class h land is removed 
from row-cropping, and an of the class 3 land is in permanent pasture 
the time the 2,600 mg/i quality level is achieved. Since no terracing 
enters the optimal solutions, and not an of the gully control structures 
are built, the major costs of the program were the opportunity costs to the 
operator of not using the best available technology. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the two cases, first, it is clear 
that in a "carrot and stick" regulatory program, no subsidy should be paid 
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for adopting a particular tillage method since the more effective erosion 
control method also yields the highest net return to the operator. Second^ 
and even of more interest, is the possibility that quality standards for 
suspended sediment could be achieved by the regulatory authority merely 
setting limits on the soil loss allowed and permitting the operator to 
choose the practices to be ençloyed. Of course, such a system presupposes 
detailed knowledge of the erosion process and transport mechanism, knowl­
edge not currently available. Clearly, from the standpoint of policing 
the system, it would be easier for the regulatory agency to prescribe 
KAdch practices would be allowed on the various land capability classes. 
This is in line with the zoning technique suggested in Chapter V. There 
is another possibility, intermediate between the two possibilities just 
described, that suggests itself from the least-cost calculations. In this 
instance the regulatory agency could prescribe permissible mixes of allow­
able tillage methods, practices, and land uses. Thus, they might specify 
that if minimum tillage is to be used on class U land, the land must be 
terraced, or if conventional tillage is to be used at all, all class h 
land must be in permanent pasture, etc. Again, more informatton would be 
required than in the case where practices are prescribed. 
In summary, it was possible to determine "efficient" means of achiev­
ing various water quality standards. Further, the programming results 
offer interesting insights into some possible approaches for regulating 
water quality. 
The final objective of the study required examination of means for 
dealing with the problem of how to best provide goods having a large degree 
of "publicness". This was the main concern of Chapter V. 
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The main concltisions reached regarding this objective were, in part, 
negative, and, in part, positive. It was concluded that the market mechar-
nism would not operate to provide the "public good": enhanced water 
quality, Tiie primary role of the economist was seen as providing to the 
decisioit-inaker information on the costs implicit in. any proposed standards. 
It was also concluded that an institutional system involving creation of a 
political-administrative entity drawn along hydrologie Unes had merit. 
While this system does not provide all the functions an economist would 
like for it to possess, i,e,, determination of hoif much to produce, how to 
distribute the costs of production, and how to distribute the "product", 
it does meet the criteria developed in Chapter H, It should be remembered 
that no system of organization meets all of the economic requiranents,^ 
However, the proposed system does bring together the supply and use areas, 
and provides a means for the involved parties to express their preferences. 
On the basis of these points, it tentatively may be concluded that (1) the 
system is a reasonable vehicle for supplying collective goods, and (2) it 
moves in the direction of achieving the first objective, 
limitations of the Analysis 
The limitations of the analysis can be divided into two categories. 
First, there are what may be termed the limitations of the physical 
model. Chief among these is the use of a highly simplified hydrologie 
system. Streams do not flow constantly at their 25-year average annual 
^ee Buchanan (12, pp. 178-186) for a detailed discussion of this 
problem. 
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rate; precipitation does not follow its long time average pattern. As a 
result, any single efvent, such as an intense rainstorm, or a prolonged 
event, such as an extended drought, can produce deviations from the aver­
age values of 200 to UOO percent. However, it should be remembered that 
limitations of this sort act primarily as constraints on realism, or the 
ability to make direct application of the findings to a specific location 
at a specific point in time. Th^y do not infringe içon the validity of 
the theoretical framework. Actually, they are nothing more than a reflec­
tion of our ignorance in certain areas of knowledge. 
Of greater significance are the limitations in the broad conceptual­
ization of the problem. For example, only a single quality parameter, 
suspended sediment, is considered. VMle such a simplification makes the 
problem more tractable, it does so at the price of applicability. Pew, if 
any, watercourses are "polluted" by a single substance. It is well known 
that a reduction in turbidity, by lowering the sediment concentration, 
frequently is followed by an increase in turbidity due to subsequent algal 
growths. Do synergistic relationships exist among other pollutants? A 
more comprehensive model would contain a set of potential pollutants and 
explanations of their interrelationships.^ To the extent that sediment may 
be viewed as representative of a broad class of nondegradable pollutants, 
the ijnpact of this particular limitation is lessened. 
"^This was done to an extent in the present study in that sediment and 
its associated pollutants were considered. While Chapters HI, 17, and V 
have ignored the associated pollutants, they will be discussed in a later 
^section of this chapter and the reason for their apparent disappearance 
Arom the discussion explained. 
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Another limitation in the second category is the assunption of a 
highly simplified polluter-user complex. On the one hand there is the 
assumption of homogeneous production units^ and on the other, a sjji^ 
municipality. Clearly any real-world basin is politically, economically, 
and demographicaUy much more complex than as represented here. However, 
limitations of this nature can be accepted if less realism means less 
conplexity and, thus, greater clarity in the underlying analysis. 
Implications of the Bindings 
There are four major inrolications of the study that follow fïom the 
study objectives and the general approach taken in the work. These are 
ermmerated and discussed below. 
1. It is possible to model, albeit simply, the physical system so as 
to explain the movement of a potential pollutant from the land to the water­
course and, finally, to the point of impact. At the same time means for 
pollution abatement can be specified rather precisely. The import of all 
this for the economist is that lAen faced with quality disparities between 
the supply and demand of a natural resource, physical systems with a rear-
sonable degree of reality can be developed with the assistance of special­
ists from other disciplines. This brings us to the second point. 
2. Studies of the sort undertaken illustrate the absolute necessity 
for interdisciplinary cooperation. It is incumbent upon the economic 
analyst to become sufficiently familiar with the basic concepts, technical 
terms, and capabilities of members of the various physical and biological 
sciences so that he may effectively communicate his needs to them. By the 
same token, the economist should make clear his concepts to the other 
305 
disciplines in order that an integrated analysis based on the several 
fields is possible. Ideally, research of the sort attempted here would be 
conducted teams of specialists from the various fields. At the very 
least, the research should be coordinated by a multidisciplinary grotg). 
3. Costs of achieving a specified quality level or a range of levels 
is easily accomplished using parametric linear programming methods. If 
one accepts Maass* view of the economist's role in public decision making, 
this is an iiqjortant fact to know. Moreover, it frequently is possible to 
distinguish those costs that are essentially private from those that might 
be shared collectively. 
U. The traditional benefit-cost analysis of welfare economics is not 
applicable to an analysis of the provision of goods and services having a 
large degree of publicness. Determination of the institutional arrange­
ments for the supply of such goods is no single task. From a theoretical 
point of view there is nothing to suggest that public goods only can be 
supplied collectively. Pragmatically, goods characterized T%r a high degree 
of publicness and many users are serious candidates for collectivization 
of supply. This stuc^y attempted to make the point that regional control 
of water quality offered certain advantages over other schemes considered. 
At the same time it was recognized that any system devised could not be 
subjected to the scrutiny of economic efficiency criteria. The particular 
system suggested should be viewed as a starting point. Any elaboration or 
modification of it is constrained only by the imaginative capacity of the 
human mind. 
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The Associated Pollutants 
The opening chapter of this study indicated that sediment and the 
substances adsorbed on the soil particles, viz., phosphorus compounds and 
pesticides, would be used to typify non-degradable pollutants fl-om the 
agricultural sector. The adsorbed compounds were referred to as the pollu­
tants "associated" with sediment. The associated pollutants, for aU 
practical purposes, have not been mentioned since. This apparent over­
sight was intentional and was based on two factors. First, the adsorbed 
substances went wherever the eroded soil particles went, so it seemed 
desirable to concentrate on describing and estimating soil erosion rates 
and specifying control techniques. If it is possible to control soil 
erosion, the associated substances will be controlled also. Second, the 
chemistry of these substances in streams is complex and, hence, not amenar 
ble to the type of analysis carried out in the study. 
In the following paragraphs some general comments are offered on the 
role of the associated substances as potential pollutants in order to 
complete the analysis. 
Phosphorus 
Phosphorus is the limiting nutrient controlling the fertility of 
natural waters (86, p. 228). Algal blooms can be stimulated by very low 
concentrations of phosphorus in solution, e.g., nuisance algal blooms occur 
>rfxen the concentration is greater than 20 ug/l (107). Phosphorus is quite 
immobile in soil due to the strong adsorption by the mineral soil particles 
(86, p. 228). Thus, erosion of the topsoil is the main mechanism for 
moving phosphorus from the land into the watercourse. Other sources of 
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the element in streams are urban sewage, including large amounts of phos­
phate detergents (107), and animal feedlot runoff (86, p. 231). Verduin 
(107) has estimated that roughly one-third of the phosphorus in surface 
waters comes from agricultural sources. 
Both Black (9) and Taylor (86, p. 230) point out that the phosphorus 
in surface waters is distributed between that in true solution and that 
found with suspended solids. Measurement of the total phosphorus present 
does not determine the amount available for aquatic plant growth. Black 
explains this phenomenon in terms of the phosphorus-buffering capacity of 
the suspended solids. As he explains the system: 
When the solids are initially suspended in rain water or when the 
stream is later diluted by low-phosphorus water, release of phoi^ho-
rus from the solids will make the concentration of phosphorus in the 
final mixture closer to that in the original soil solution than would 
be predicted from a simple dilution effect. Conversely, if a stream 
receives high-phosphorus water from another source, such as sewage, 
the soil-derived solids will take up phosphorus from the water and 
will reduce the concentration of phosphorus in solution (9), 
Vftiat this suggests is that the level of phosphorus in solution is a func­
tion of many factors. As a result, the task of setting standards for 
phosphorus in watercourses is an extremely complex and difficult task. 
There does seem to be a consensus that the best means of controlling 
phosphorus from the agricultural sector is through controlling soil 
erosion. 
Pesticides 
The term "pesticide" is one that encompasses a wide variety of chemi­
cal substances, laznbert ^  al., as quoted by Kunze p. U9), list the 
following factors as determining the fate of a chemical in soil: 
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1. lype of soil 
2. T^ipe of chemical 
3. Climatic conditions 
U» Biological population 
S. Method of application 
Depending upon a number of hydrologie factors, pesticides may stay in the 
soil, percolate down through it, or move over the surface (^6, p. 71). 
Nicholson (6?) points out that runoff is the "single most widespread 
source of low level surface water contamination by pesticides," Transport 
may be by the pesticide adsorbed on particulate matter, in solution, or 
both. 
Of greatest concern from the point of view of the impact on the 
environment are the persistent chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticides such 
as DDT or dieldrin. As was the case with phosphorus, control measures 
focus on erosion control. The problem of setting standards also exists. 
Noting that DDT is very hydrophobic and is found M solution only in very 
low concentrations, Nicholson (6?) makes the following sobering observation 
about IDT, 
It does tend to concentrate and persist in other compartments of the 
l^ydrosphere. Such data gives reason to pause and reconsider whenever 
the urge strikes to set permissible limits for this and similar 
coitpounds in water alone where the objective is to maintain a suit­
able overall ernriromant for aquatic life. 
Suggestions for Further Stucty 
Viewed in the broadest context, almost every siir^liiying assumption 
made hi the study is a candidate for additional study. This is true for 
the obvious reason that the simplifications were needed because of lack of 
knowledge. However, the suggestions made here will be confined primarily 
to the social sciences and especially the field of economics. If the 
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suggestion made earlier regarding interdisciplinary teams working on the 
type of problem reported here is heeded, presumably individual projects 
conducted concurrently by the team members wotild help fill the knowledge 
gaps. 
The present study is seen as an early attempt at working through the 
implications of treating pollution abatement as a public good problem. 
Only recently have substantial numbers of economists begun to view water 
quality as a collective good. The first published recognition of this 
viewpoint of idiich I am aware is Kaden Boyd's (10, p. 202) discussion of 
"water quality as a public consumption good". The pure theory of public-
goods allocation romains incomplete as does the theory of fiscal institu­
tions (12, p. 169). 
Several majw avenues of research are seen as needed and feasible for 
the immediate future. All, basically, are extensions of the present study. 
They may be classified according to irtxether th^y seek (l) to relax one or 
more of the assumptions, (2) to iirprove the data used, or (3) to pursue 
new or unconpleted implications of the study. 
In the first group, additional stucfy is needed of models that use 
different quality parameters and sets of parameters. Exploration of the 
concept of the "next highest use" would be of particular interest. Under 
this concept, quality sets for various uses would be specified and an 
attempt made to order the uses. The quality characteristics of supplies 
could be specified, and ary complementary, neutral, or competitive relation­
ships that exist between uses and the supplies determined. The economic 
implications of moving a supply from one use to the next higher one then 
could be studied. 
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Much of the research needed in the area of iiig)roved data falls in 
the domain of the physical and biological sciences. A better tinder-
standing of the movement of pollutants through the ecosystem as veU as 
their intact upon it would be of immense value. At the same time^ econo­
mists should not abandon their attempts to quantify the damages inflicted 
by various pollutants. Of more iimnediate need, however, are isproved 
estimates of abatement costs of complex sets of pollutants. 
The third area, of needed research offers some of the most challenging 
and, potentially, the most rewarding opportunities to the social scientist. 
Using the present study as a starting point, research is needed on the 
specific conditions (1) for determining how to compute the charges associ­
ated with pollution abatement, and (2) for specif^ying who would bear the 
cost. In addition, more conplex political interactions need to be ana-
Hyzed; the impact and effectiveness of different taxation methods need to 
be studied; analysis of management enti1d.es that differ as to size, powers, 
and type of regional delineation should be made. Hnally, systems of 
environmental management that consider the nation's waste assimilative 
capacity as an eidiaustible resource, and consider land, air, and water 
quality problems simultaneously must be developed. 
Summary 
The study reported here focuses on the agricultural sector as a source 
of substances that may pollute watercourses. Suspended sediment from guUy 
and sheet erosion of crop and,pasture lands was selected to typify nond&-
gradable, diffuse-source pollutants. %e choice of sediment was based on 
(1) the magnitude of the erosion problem; (2) the relatively good under-
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standing that exists of the erosion process and the sediment transport 
mechanism; and (3) the fact that sediment can act not only as a pollutant 
per se but also as a transporting agent for polluting substances adsorbed 
on the sediment particles, e.g., pho^horus coiqpounds and certain pesti­
cides. 
Water quality enhancement ("pollution abatement"), as it applies to 
-watercourses, is viewed as a public good. Consequently, traditional cost-
benefit analysis is rejected and cos-Ueffectiveness is the analytical 
approach used. Exogenously specified water quality criteria for several 
water uses are taken as indicators of societal preferences. Alternative 
means for controlling erosion at the source are developed as activities 
in a linear programming framework. 
An intrastate river basin in Iowa is used as the stuc^ area. Aggro-
gative data for the basin (land use by land capability class), obtained 
from the 196? içxiate of the Conservation Needs Inventory, constitute the 
basic building blocks for physically modeling the study area. 
By parametrically changing idxe quality level constraints, least^cost 
estimates of achieving successively hi^er quality standards were obtained. 
Different schemes for sharing the costs were examined and evaluated in 
terms of previously specified characteristics desired of the institutional 
system. It was concluded that a basin-wide management authority with broad 
powers would best meet the desired ends. 
Any direct application of the study results is limited by the many 
simplifying assunptions necessary, especially in the hydrolo^c model. It 
is felt that problems of the sort studied here should be researched by 
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interdisciplinary teams, %th such research efforts it should be possible 
to nake the analysis more realistic. 
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Table 10. Development of the cropping management factor (C) for 
conventional tillage of a corzv-com-soybeans rotation^ 
(1) (2) (3) (U) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Soil-
Readings, EI in loss 
curve 13° stage period ratio Cols. C-value 
Operation® Date period (^) (5)x(6) (Z Col, 7) 
CORN AITER SOÏBEANS 
TP-com I4./IO 
P-com 5A 
% 
HV-com 31/1 . _ 
TP-corn UAo M CU .06 .36 .0216 .1502 
CORN AFSm CORN 
TP-com L/lO 
P-com 5/i 
% 
HV-com 31/1 
TP-beans U/25 106 CU .08 .30 .02k0 .3817 
SOYBEANS AFTER CORN 
TP-beans U/25 
P-beans 5/l5 
6/25 
ihs 
HV-beans 10/l5 
TP-com li/lO lOU SbU .08 .30 .02kO MOIS 
u Sbit -
- J -
7 F .03 .U3^ .0129 
18 Cl .31 .76 .0836 
hi C2 .29 .60 .17U0 
98 C3 .51 .31 .1581 
lOU .
k CU 
7 F .03 .36® .0108 
18 Cl .11 .63 .0693 
U7 C2 .29 .50 .1U50 
98 C3 .51 .26 .1326 
Oh 
CO 0
 .
 . . U
6 CU 
12 F .06 .36^ .0216 
35 Sbl .23 .63 .1UU9 
57 Sb2 .22 .50 .3100 
96 Sb3 .39 .26 .lOlU 
. U0
^Follows example shown in (115, Table 5, p. 35). 
^TP « ticraplow, P - plant, HV » harvest. 
^Source; (115, Hgure 11, p. 2U). 
*%alues frcK (115, Tabla 2, lins 36, p. 12) x 120^. Adjustment based 
on (63) to reflect higher soil loss lAien com follows sojibeans. 
^Values from (115, Table 2, line 36, p. 12) used as representative of 
continuous com. 
f Soybean soil-loss ratio assumed to be equal to that for continuous 
com. 
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Table 11. Development of the cropping management factor (C) for ndidnum 
tillage of a com-coM^soybean rotation? 
(1) (2) (3) (U) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SoilM 
Readings, Crop- EI in loss 
cujrve 13® stage period ratio Cols. G-value 
Operation Date (A period œ (A (S)*(6) (ZC61. 7) 
OCm AFm SOYBEANS—RESIDUE: 
P-com 
1500-2000 Ib/ac 
HV-com 
B-com 
I » 
7 SbU — 
- d -
18 CI .11 MB .0528 
ii7 02 .29 .38 .1102 
98 03 .51 .22 .1322 
107 ch .09 .30 .0270 
CCRN AFTER C®»—RESIDUE: 3000-U000 Ib/ac 
P-com 5A 7 Ch _ — — 
6A 18 CI .11 .20® .0220 
7/1 U7 C2 .29 .16 .0U61t 
HV-com Û/1 98 03 .51 .09 .Olt59 
P-beans 5A5 112 Git .lit .15 .0210 
SOYBEANS AFTER CQRIt—RESIDUE: 3OOO-UOOO Ib/ac 
P-beans 5A5 12 CU — 
6/15 35 Sbl .23 
7/15 57 Sb2 .22 
HV-beans 10/15 96 Sb3 .39 
P-com 5/1 107 Sblt .11 
.20^ 
.16 
.09 
.15 
.Oli.60 
.0352 
.0351 
.0165 
.3022 
.1353 
.1328 
^Follows exançle shown in (115, Table 5, p. 35). 
" plant, H\r - harvest, 
^SoTirce: (115, Figure 11, p. 2U). 
Values from (Hit, Table 1, 1500 lb residue level, p. 52) x 120$, 
Adjustment based on (63) to reflect higher soil loss \dien com follows 
soybeans. 
^Values from (lilt. Table 1, 3000 lb residue level, p. 52) for com 
after com. 
Soybean soil-loss ratio assumed to be equal to that for com after 
com. 
Table 12, Conçuted erosion rates by land capability class for two tillage systems 
Slope Slope A*RKI^PC (tons/ac) 
Ce^>ability length gradient RKI£P Rotation 
class (ft) {%) R K 15 P (tons/ac) c».2t502® c«.38l7® c".li015^ average 
Conventional tillage 
I 300 1,0 170 .33 .237 1 13.296 5.986 5.075 5.3Wt 5.468 
n 300 3.5 170 .33 .611, 1 3ii.ia,5 15.507 I3.U48 13.843 14.166 
HI 600 9.5 170 .33 3.100 1 173.910 78.291 66,380 69.89k 71.523 
IV 600 17.0 170 .33 7.773 1 436,065 156.316 166,14x6 175.255 179.339 
I^lnimum tillage 
I 
n 
III 
17 
Same as above 
c».3022^ c=.13$3^ c-»1328^ 
13.296 
3U.14t5 
173.910 
U36.06^ 
li.0l8 
10.109 
52.^^6 
131.779 
1.799 
23.530 
59.000 
1.766 
li.57U 
23.095 
57.909 
2.528 
6.5U8 
33.060 
82.896 
®From Table 10, 
^From Table 11, 
Table 13, Craiçuted erosion rates by land capability class for terraced land and two tillage systems-
Slope Slope 
Capability length gradient 
class (ft) R K LS 
A-RKXSPC (tons/ac) 
RKLSP . . . Rotation 
P (tons/ac) c«.li502 c«,38l7^ c".U019 average 
Conventional tillage 
n 188 h 170 .33 .562 .03 0.9158 0.1I26 0.361 0.380 0.389 
III 138 10 170 .33 1.605 .03 2.7012 1.216 1.031 1.086 1.111 
IV 118 18 170 .33 3.791 .03 6.3853 2.875 2.137 2.566 2.626 
Minimum tiUlaRe c".3022° c».1353° C-.1353° 
n 0.9U58 0.286 0.128 0.126 0.180 
in Sane as above 2.7012 0.816 0.365 0.359 0.513 
IV 6.3853 1.930 0.861* 0.8L8 1.22h 
®Iiaflen, John, A.R.S,, U,S.D.A,, Ames, Iowa. Trap efficiency of level terraces without tile 
outlets. Private communication. March 1970. 
^'From Table 10. 
°Ppam Table 11. 
Table lU* Conqmted erosion rates by land cf^bllity class for contouring and two tillage systems 
Slope Slope 
Capability lengUx gradient 
class (ft) 
A-RKLSPC (toi^/ac) 
RKI5 , . Rotation 
K IB (tons/ac) P® c«.l+502 c".38l7 c-.LOip" average 
Conventional tillage + contouring 
I 
n 
300 1.0 170 .33 .237 
300 3.5 170 .33 .6m 
Mlnimm tillage + contouring 
^ Sane as above 
13.296 
3U.UU5 
13.296 
0.6 3.591 
0.5 7.75U 
3.0U5 
6.57k 
3.206 
6.923 
c".3022° c".1353° c=.1328° 
0.6 2.101 
0.5 5.205 
1.079 
2.330 
1.059 
2.287 
3.281 
7.083 
1.517 
3.271» 
^Source: (115, Table 6, p. 36) 
^From Table 10. 
°Erom Table 11. 
liiO 
Table l5« Computed erosion rates Iqr land capability class of permanent 
pasture 
Slope Slope 
Capability length gradient A=RICLSPC 
class (ft) R K IS P (tons/ao) 
I 300 1.0 170 .33 .237 1 .OOii 0.053 
n 300 3.5 170 .33 .6lL 1 .oou 0.138 
III 600 9,B 170 .33 3.100 1 .oou 0.696 
IV 600 17.0 170 .33 7.773 1 .006 2.616 
VI 600 25.0 170 .33 15.067 1 .006 5.072 
711 600 30.0 170 .33 17.U33 1 .010 9.980 
Source: (11$, Table 2, Unes 120-222, p. lit). 
m 
Table 16. Estimates of sediment contributed by guCUjing, amount of 
sediment retention per structwe, and number of structures 
needed to protect basin 
SAMPIE OF WATBRSHEBS® 
Waters Acres Struct. 
shed in water­ density Soil delivered to stream (tons) 
number shed (ac/struct.) without struct. with struct. 
27 16,920 1,000 22,567 I,81t9 
11 39,29lt 670 75,673 7,570 
23 3,812 liSO 19,192 1,930 
33 9,5U7 530 m3,m 13,118 
19 83,100 903 310,905 37,891 
15 86,121 BiiO 32lt,809 57,265 
61 7,500 750 53,117 6,051 
Totals 2li6,29li^ 5,173 880,583 128,67a 
Averages 739 3.575 tona/ac 0.522 tons/ac 
Tons/structure - 739(3.575 - 0,522) • 2256 
EXTRAPOUTION TO BASIN 
Number acres Class IIE - VIIE crop and pasture land: 1,179,392*^ 
I^axLraum number structures required: ^79392 ac , i 596 structures 
739 ac/str 
Edwin B., Geologist, Soil Conservation Service, U.S.D.A., 
Des Moines, Iowa. Summary of watershed protection data in Nishnabotna 
Basin. Private communication, April 6, 1970. 
^Percentage of acres in inventory: 2h%, 
°Pram Table 1. 
1U2 
Table 17. Tearly runoff, suspended sedimsnt loads, mean discharge and 
suspended sediment concentrations, Nishnabotna River at 
Hamburg, Iowa, 19UO-1563 
Yearly Sediment 
mean _ Ïear3y Sediment concentration 
Water discharge runoff® load® 
year® (cfs) (1000 ac/ft) (1000 tons) ppm mgA® 
19U0 U3U 31k.7 7,142.9 17,101 17,800 
la 535 387.3 8,584.6 16,317 16,600 
li2 1,282 928.5 13,721.0 10,881 10,900 
U3 850 615.2 32,155.0 3li,5L5 34,500 
hk 1,197 869.3 35,li6U.O 13,095 13,100 
U5 1,796 1,300.0 1U,60U.0 8,270 8,270 
U6 1,135 806.9 7,803.0 7,13f 7,120 
U7 2,572 1,862.0 37,127.0 Ik,678 34,700 
li8 931 675.5 10,286.0 11,210 11,200 
U9 1,090 789.0 9,109.0 8,788 8,800 
1950 825 597.3 6,595.0 8,128 8,100 
51 2,180 1,526.0 2U,262.0 11,704 31,700 
52 1,632 1,170.0 17,500.0 11,011 31,000 
53 878 635.8 8,120.0 9,402 9,400 
5U 38U 278.0 2,830.0 7,494 7,490 
55 U96 359.0 3,920.0 8,038 8,040 
56 238 172.7 1,570.0 6,692 6,690 
57 501 362 .U 3,970.0 8,064 8,060 
58 1,177 852.1 11,750.0 10,148 10,100 
• 59 1,231 891.2 12,600.0 10,408 10,400 
I960 1,182 1,076.0 15,950.0 10,912 10,900 
61 1,158 838.6 11,610.0 10,192 10,200 
62 1,819 1,317.0 17,500.0 9,782 9,780 
63 666 U82.2 5,750.0 8,778 8,780 
Average 1,099 796.125 31,689.021 10,600 
%ater year is defined as the period October 1 to September 30. 
^Source: (100, pp. h0$-U06) and (99, p. 292), 
^Source: (61, Table 1). 
Calculated from relationship: Concentration " (736.1501)(tons)/ac-ft. 
^Conversion factor for converting ppm to mg/l given in (102, Table 1, 
p. 192). 
m3 
Table 18. Technological factors associated with meeting the water supply 
requirements of a city of 10,000 population 
Sizing the water siq^ly plant 
Mean gallons per capita per day^: 
Ratio maxiimm to average daily demand^: 
12U 
1.8U 
Required plant capacity, gallons per day: (12U)(10000)(1.86) = 2,306,100 
Design capacity (mgd): 
Design capacity (gpm): 
Transmission lines° 
Velocity of flow in lines (ft>s) : 
Friction loss (H^), ft/lOOO ft: 
lift: 
c Veils 
Number 
Depth, ft. 
Pumps: Capacity, gpm 
Number 
Type 
Lift 
Wire to water efficiency (E^) 
2.5 
1736 
3-U 
Diameter, inches 
22. 2k 2à 
11 5 3 
50 ft + Hf. 
50 
600 
k 
Vertical turbine 
50 ft + 
0 % 
^Source: (79, Table 2, p. 1509). 
^Source: (79, Table 7, p. 1513). 
^Johnson, R. L., Dept. of Civil Engineering, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa. Technical data on water supply systems. Aiivate coimunLcation. 
April 17, 1970. 
%hree 600 gpm pumps will meet the systw requirements. A fourth well 
and pung) is included as a reserve mit. 
2kh 
APPESÏDIX B. COST IMA 
Table 19a. Field operation times and variable costs for two tillage systems on class I and II lands® 
No. 
of 
mits 
Held operation 
Rate of 
accoitQ^lishment 
(hr/ac) 
Held 
time 
(hr/ac) 
Man hours as 
percent of 
power hours 
Direct 
labor 
(hr/ac) 
Fuel, oil, 
lube 
($/ac) 
Repairs 
($/ac) 
Conventional tillage 
1 Disk stalks .107 .107 102 .109 .nil .108 
2 Flow 
^16" bottoms .366 .203 108 .395 .391 .2621 
it-l6" bottoms (2-way) .iil»7 .183 .391 .580^ 
1 1st disking .107 .107 102 .109 .nil .108 
1 2nd disking + apply herb.. 
iaasect. .113 .113 no .12h .iiL .108 
1 Planting .1511° .I51i 116 .179 .083 ,2h6 
1 Rotary hoe (100^ .080 .080 102 .082 .073 .026 
1 1st cultivation (50^ .176 .088 IQU .092 .116 .060 
1 2nd cultivation ($0^ .176 .088 lOU .092 .116 .060 
1 Combine .65U .763 
Com head .a# 100 .1;# «... .527 
Bean table .35L0 .3^ 100 .351 WW .Olid 
Tractor repsdrs: 
.6Wfd $0 HBHP 
70 IBHP .5kod 
TOTAIg 1.7U9 2.ii7l» 2.17 3.97 
— 
Minimum tillage 
1 Disk stalks .107 .107 102 .109 .llU .108 
1 Tin plant • fert., herb.. 
insect. .170° .170 120 .20ii .083 .166 
1 Cultivate (100^ 
1 Cultivate (diskhiHer) 
(100^ 
1 Combine 
Corn head 
Bean table 
Tractor repairs: 
70 DBHP 
TOTAIS 
.176 .176 lOU 
.176 .176 lOU 
.li55 .U55 100 
.3^° .35U 100 
1.138 
,183 .116 .060 
183 .116 .060 
.6^ .763 
.527% 
35h .oia^ 
.710^ 
l.k88 1.08 2.hh 
®Data taken from (20, Tables 1, It) except as noted, 
^alue used is twice that given in (20) for ii-bottora or»-way plow. 
°Marley, Stephen J., Associate Professor, Dept. of Agricultural Eiigineering, Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa. Typical values of farm inçleraent operating speeds and efficiencies on 
Iowa flat lands. Private communication. May 12, 1970. 
(^Calculated from (30, Table 7, p. 9). 
Table 19b» îlxed costs of equipment used for row-croppitig for two tillage systems^ 
Machine No. Size 
Cost per 
machine 
($) 
Total 
cost 
($) 
D^reciation, 
interest, tazoes, 
insurance rate 
(percent) 
Total 
fixed 
cost 
($) 
Conventional tillage 
Tractor 1 50 IBHP 8,000 8,000 lit. 825 1,186 
Tractor 1 70 EBHP 9,000 9,000 lit. 825 1,33k 
Uoldboard plow 1 5-bot. 16" 1,875 1,875 16.875 317 
Holdboard plow 1 U-bot. 16" 
(2-way) 3,320% 3,320 16.875 560% 
Tandem disk w/dry chemical 
attachment 1 19 ft. 2A65 2,U65 16.875 lil6 
Conventional row planter 1 6-row 30" 2,275 2,275 16.875 38U 
Rotary hoe 1 &.row 30" 850 850 16.875 1U3 
Cultivator (standard) 1 &-row 30" 1,010 1,010 16.875 170 
SF combine 1 230 bu/kr 11,050 n,o5o 16.875 1,865 
• Com head 1 it-row 30" h,600 h,6oo 26.875 776 
Bean table 1 10 ft. 1,5000 1,500 16.875 253 
Wagons-side dunç 3 185 bu. 600 1,800 16.875 303 
T0TAI5 U7,7U5 7,707 
Minimum tillage 
Tanden disk 1 IS ft. 1,800 1,800 16.875 30lt 
Till planter w/fert,, herb.. 
insect, attachments 1 6-row 30" 3,100 3,100 16.875 523 
Cultivator (standard) 1 6-row 30" 1,010 1,010 16.875 170 
Cultivator (disk hiller) 1 6-row 30" 1,095 1,095 16.875 185 
Tractor 1 70 IBHP 9,000 9,000 lb.825 l,33li 
Combine (same as arxfve) 1 Sane 17>l50 17*150 16,875 2>89U 
Wagons-side duîip 3 185 bu. 600 1,800 16.875 303 
TOTAIS 3U,955 5,713 
®Data taken from (20, Tables 1, 2, 3) exc^t as noted. 
N'Elue used lo twice that given in (20) for U-bottom one-way plow. 
°Cost obtained by contacting several farm iugxLement dealers in the Ames, Iowa, area. 
Table 20, Production costs associated with row-crc^ping for two tillage systems and different 
land treatment practices^ 
Direct 
labor 
(hr/ac) 
Labor 
costs @ 
$2/hr 
($/ac) 
Fuel, oil, 
lube. 
($/ac) If to 
Total 
variable 
costs 
($/ao) 
Fixed 
costs 
($/ac) 
Total 
prod'n. 
costs 
($/ac) 
Conventional tillage 
KLatlands and terraces 2.U7li^ U.95 2.17b 3.97b n.09 17.13° 28.22 
T%)land and contours'^ 3.266 6.53 2.86 5.2k 14.63 17.13 31.76 
Mnimum tillage 
Flatlands and terraces l.U88^ 2.98 1.08% 2.16* 6.20 12.70° 19.20 
%%aand and contours^ 1.96k 3.93 1.W 3.22 8.58 12.70 21.28 
^Ibcludes time-related factors: plow, plant, cultivate, harvest. Costs of seed, fertilizers, 
herbicides, insecticides, storage, and shelter are excluded. 
^Taken ftom Table 19a. 
°Con^ted from Table 19b by dividing total fixed costs by kSO acres. 
^onputed by multiplying flatland values by 1,32, based on results obtained by Smith (81, 
p. 3li5). 
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Table 21. Permanent pasture renovation and maintenance costs ' 
Seed 
rate 
(Ib/ac) Hburs/ac $/ac 
Renovation 
Equipment costs 1.71 6.95 
(plow, disk, harrow, drill, cultipak, cHp) 
labor ($2.00/hr) 1.71 3.h2 
Seed 
Smooth bromegrass 15 U.05 
Oats 2.50 
Fertilizer 
N (9^/lb) 30 2.70 
PgO^ (9^/lb) ho 3.60 
LLme 12.00 
Total renovation costs 35.22 
Annual renovation costs (10 years use) 3.52 
Interest (opportunity cost) at 7^% 1.36 
Tbtal annual renovation cost li.88 
Maintenance (medium level) ° 
Clip (labor and machinery) 1.68 
Fertilizer 
N (9^/ib) 100 9.00 
PgO^ (9#/3Jb) UO 3.60 
Total annual maintenance cost 111.28 
TOTAL ANNUAL RMOVATHDN AND MAINTENANCE COST 15.16 
%ased on Kuhlmann, R. W., Dept. of Agronomy, Iowa State IMversity, 
Ames, Iowa. Preliminary estimates of costs of renovating and maintaining 
various pasture and forage crops in southern Iowa. Private ccamunication. 
May 13, 1970. 
^Smooth bromegrass with continuous grazing. 
^Based on recomn&endations in (108, Table 3) for tall grasses. 
Table 22. Crop productivities, gross revenues and land values by c«^}ar* 
bi]lty class for Ilarshall silty clay loan 
Yields" Crop prices—1969 
Capabilii^ Slope Erosion Com Soybeans Hay Com Soybeans Hay 
class phase phase (bu/ac) (bu/ac) (toiyac) ($/bu) ($A^) ($/tcn) 
I 
n 
in 
17 
VI 
vn 
A 
B 
c 
D 
Avg, 
E 
F 
G 
g 
0 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
109 
lOU 
99 
81 
69 
la 
uo 
38 
32 
26 
li.l 
3.9 
3.8 
3.2 
2.6 
2.(f 
1.5% 
1.08 2.1i0 20.60 
\ / 
Benton, Thomas E., Dept. of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, 
Iowa. Revised estimates of crop yitixis on Jiom soils. Private conBimni-
cation. June 1970. 
^Source: (85). 
®CRS • "cam suitability rating", an index of suitability of land 
for row crops. 
^tocimum CRS value in Marshall soil association assigned to Minden 
soil: CRS • 95. Source: Footmte a, supra. 
®7alue of $U6l per acre for "high grade land" in southwest Iowa as 
reported by (6U, Table 3, p. 9) assigned to Minden soil, CRS ratio x 
$U6l •> land value. 
^Interest rate based on (96, Table 1, p. 5). 
^Cggpability class assumed to have half of land in slope phase C 
and half in slope phase D. 
^Extrapolated from preceding values. 
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Gross revenues Charge 
Rotation Ratio: Land to land 
Com Soybeans average CRS^ value® at 7.5^ 
($/ac) ($/ac) ($/ao) CRS^»® GRS-95 ($/ac) ($/ac) 
117.72 98.10 8U.U6 111.28 90 .9U73 136.70 32.75 
112.32 96.00 80.3k 106.88 83 .8736 381.50 28.61 
106.92 91.20 78.28 101.68 68 .7157 329.9U 2k.75 
90.72 76.80 65.92 86.08 55 .5789 266.8k 20.02 
72.10 93.88 22.39 
7U.52 62.UO 53.56 70.U8 U5 .4736 218.33 16.37 
- - la.20 25 .2631 121.29 9.10 
- - 30.90 15 .1578 72.75 5.k5 
Table 23. Cost by land capabililgr class of level terraces with grassed 
backslopes 
Capability 
class 
Terrace 
interval® 
(ft) 
Terrace 
footage^ 
(ft/ac) 
Ifait 
cost® 
($/ft) 
Const* n. 
cost 
($/ac) 
Annual 
capital 
charge 
at 7Î % 
($/ac) 
Annual 
maint, 
cost® 
($/ac) 
II 188 231.7 0.26 60.21 a.52 0.06 
m 138 315.7 0,26 82.07 6.16 0.06 
IV 118 369.2 0.26 95.98 7.20 0.06 
^Smithj Volney, Ass't. State Conservation Engineer^ SGS, U.S.DJl.j 
Des Moines, Iowa. Costs, technical standards and specifications for level 
terraces. Private communication. May 26, 1970. 
^Feet of terrace per acre • 143,560 ft^/ac/terrace interval. 
^Source* (83, p. l8). 
'^From Table 22. 
^Production costs from (36, Table 3, p. It) for cam-cornrsqybeans 
rotation. 
15U 
Production foregone to land in backslope 
Net Percent $/ac Total cost 
Gross Prod'n. revenue land in of (capital-hnaint, 
revenue® costs® foregone back- protected +prod»n. foregone) 
($/ac) ($/ac) ($/ac) slope acres ($/ac) 
106.88 39.00 67.88 4.2$ 2.88 7.U6 
93.88 39.00 5it.80 13.0 7.12 13.3U 
70.48 39.00 31.18 23.7 7.16 llt.72 
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Table 2U. Annual capital recovery costs of drop inlet guUy control 
structures 
1. Average drainage area (acres/structure) : 739^ 
2. Cost per structure (196? prices): $21,700^ 
3. Construction cost price adjustment, 1967-1^6?: 1.00^7° 
U. Cost per structure (196$ prices): $21,802 
5. Structure design period: 50 years^ 
6. Interest rate: L.8752^ 
7. Capital recovery calculations^: 
p a Aid + i)" Where: R = Annual cost 
(1 + i)R -1 A " Cost of structure 
i = Diterest rate 
n = Design period 
$21802(0.OU875)(1.01875)^° 
" a.Oli875pO - 1 
« $21802(0»OU875) (10.801:35) 
9.80U35 
" $1171.25 per year per structure 
®From Table l6, 
^^ELllot, L. S., Planning Engineer, SOS, U.S.D.A,, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Data on construction costs and design period of P.L. 566 structures. 
Private communication. April 6, 1970. 
^Source: (22, 23). 
^Ausan, Joseph, Agricultural Economist, SOS, U.S.D.A., Des Moines, 
Iowa. Interest rate used for P.L, 566 projects in 196?. Private 
communication. May, 1970. 
%ource: (25, p. 18-12). 
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Table 25. Costs of canmonents of alternative municipal "Hater supplies 
(1969 prices) 
Transmission costs 
Line Miles 
diameter of 
(in.) line 
12 1 
2h 3 
16 8 
Pumpage costs® 
12 
2li 
16 
Wel3 C08t4 
Each 
li veils 
Puïiç cost^ 
Each 
U PUB^S 
Treatment® (fixed and variable) 
Surface supply 
Ground supply 
$1000/mi^ 
19,121 
59,107 
69,377 
$Aooo gal 
0.083 
0.035 
Total 
cost 
($) 
19,121 
177,322 
555,017 
b Annual cost 
n-30, i-.OU 
2,811 
10,258 
32,108 
l;,311t 
5,153 
7,070 
Annual cost^ 
n"25, i=.OL 
(¥F) 
303.1t3 
1,213.73 
Annual cost^ 
n-l5, i".OU 
($/yr) 
285.60 
l,llt2.la 
$/yr for 2.5 mgd 
76,072 
32,060 
®Cost determined using relationship given in (1^0) with right of way 
cost assumed to be zero and costs adjusted îroa. I96U to 1969 level using 
(21, 23). 
^Annual capital recovery costs computed using equation in (26, p. 18-
12) for design period, n, and interest rate, i, indicated. 
^Computed using information in Table 18, relationships given in (37) 
and power cost • $.03/kwh. 
Computed using information in Table I8, relationships given in (28) 
and prices adjusted from 3566 to 1969 level usijog (22, 23). 
^Computed from relationships shown in (38, figure 2, Figure U) and 
costs adjusted from 196U to 1969 level using (21, 23) • 
